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MAKING PRECONCEPTION TORT THEORY
CRISPER
MARK STRASSER*
More and more individuals seeking to expand their families make use of
someone else’s gametes to help create a child. Unsurprisingly, those
considering the use of donated or purchased gametes often seek reassurance
that the use of those gametes will not create an increased risk that a child
thereby produced will have a severe disease. Sometimes, because of negligence
or recklessness, gametes are used that result in children having severe disease
where that outcome would have been avoided though the use of reasonable
care. Regrettably, courts addressing whether liability may be imposed in such
cases have sometimes misunderstood and misapplied the prevailing
reproductive torts jurisprudence and denied recovery, thereby promoting the
very practices that public policy should discourage. This Article offers courts
an approach that is more likely to promote both individual interests and good
public policy.
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I. INTRODUCTION
More and more couples enlarge their families by making use of donated or
purchased gametes.1 These couples can acquire gametes from a variety of
sources,2 although a separate issue involves whether states afford a remedy in
cases involving compromised gametes the use of which results in foreseeable
harm. Courts have struggled when analyzing such cases, all too often offering
rationales and reaching conclusions that are both surprising and disappointing
in light of the existing reproductive torts jurisprudence.3 Recent scientific
developments help shed light on a more appropriate way to allocate the benefits
and burdens associated with the use of foreseeably compromised gametes.
Part II of this Article discusses two of the prenatal torts—wrongful birth
and wrongful pregnancy. States differ about whether to recognize these causes
of action and about which kinds of damages may be awarded to a successful
plaintiff. Nonetheless, important lessons can be learned from these cases
because the differing states make clear which factors are important to consider
when deciding which kinds of reproductive harms are compensable.
Part III considers other kinds of reproductive torts. These other kinds of
reproductive torts are more closely analogous to the kinds of torts that are the
focus of discussion here—negligent testing and implantation of compromised
gametes—and thus should be used to provide the framework for deciding
whether such harms should be compensable. Regrettably, courts have
misapplied the lessons to be learned from the wrongful birth and wrongful
pregnancy jurisprudence and have thus been led astray when analyzing
whether, or to what extent, recovery is permissible when the negligent use of
compromised gametes results in foreseeable harm. Courts’ rationales limiting
or denying recovery in the compromised gametes context would, if taken
seriously, imply that a whole host of cases has been wrongly decided. Courts
must reexamine their reluctance to permit full recovery in cases involving the
negligent use of compromised gametes.

1. Cf. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Collaborative Family-Making: From Acquisition to
Interconnection, 64 VILL. L. REV. 223, 225 (2019) (noting that “the exchange of money to third parties
for gametes and wombs is widely considered unproblematic”).
2. Camille Gear Rich, Contracting Our Way to Inequality: Race, Reproductive Freedom, and
the Quest for the Perfect Child, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2375, 2386 (2020) (discussing “the broad
reproductive choices Americans are offered in the ART market . . . .”).
3. See, for example, Paretta v. Med. Offs. for Hum. Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639 (Sup. Ct. 2003)
(rejecting that liability could be imposed, alleged negligent conduct notwithstanding).
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II. WRONGFUL BIRTH AND WRONGFUL PREGNANCY CLAIMS
States recognize a variety of torts in the reproductive context, and these
torts help provide the backdrop for the kinds of reproductive negligence that
should be considered actionable.4 Wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy
claims are of special relevance, because they can include allegations that
negligence occurring prior to pregnancy led to foreseeable, compensable harm.
A close examination of these kinds of cases, including the rationales for when
and why damages may be awarded, helps illustrate the kinds of rationales that
have been thought to carry weight in limiting or precluding recovery. None of
these rationales support limiting damages in a context where compromised
gametes are used to bring about foreseeable harm.
A. Wrongful Birth
Plaintiffs in a wrongful birth action seek damages from a medical provider
whose alleged negligence played a causal role in the birth of a child with
possibly severe handicaps.5 That negligence might have occurred pre- or postconception.6
The Alabama Supreme Court explained wrongful birth in the following
way:
[A] “wrongful birth action” refers to a claim for relief by
parents who allege they would have avoided conception or
would have terminated the pregnancy but for the negligence of
those charged with prenatal testing, genetic prognosticating, or
counseling parents as to the likelihood of giving birth to a
physically or mentally impaired child.7

4. See Kathy Seward Northern, Procreative Torts: Enhancing the Common-Law Protection for
Reproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV., 489, 526–29 (1998).
5. Mark Strasser, Yes, Virginia, There Can Be Wrongful Life: On Consistency, Public Policy,
and the Birth-Related Torts, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 821, 821 (2003) (“The paradigmatic cases of
wrongful birth and wrongful life involve the negligence of a health care professional resulting in the
birth of a child with severe handicaps.”).
6. Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Re-Birthing Wrongful Birth Claims in the Age of IVF and Abortion
Reforms, 50 STETSON L. REV. 85, 96–97 (2020).
The negligent act may occur in utero, depriving the mother of the right to
abortion, or prior to conception, interfering with the parental exercise of a right
to prevent pregnancy. Regardless of the timing of the act, the eventual harm is
the same. These cases are generally considered pure “wrongful birth.”
Id. (footnotes omitted).
7. Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Ala. 1993).
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In many cases, the negligence occurs during the pregnancy, for example, a
medical provider fails to detect that the fetus has a particular condition, and the
parents would have aborted the pregnancy had they been apprised of the fetal
condition in a timely fashion.8 Or, a medical professional might have failed to
advise his patient about the dangers posed to the fetus if the patient had rubella
during her pregnancy, and the patient would have aborted her fetus if only she
had been given the relevant information.9 Or, the medical professional might
have made an error when performing a test or reporting the test results, which
led to the parents’ decision to continue the pregnancy rather than seek an
abortion.10 In all of these cases, a medical professional’s negligence resulted in
a pregnant woman not having important information that would have affected
her decision about whether to carry her pregnancy to term.
Some couples, fearing what they might pass on to their child, seek genetic
testing to find out if they are carriers of a particular disease.11 The testing might
occur relatively early in the pregnancy—a positive result would cause the
couple to abort the pregnancy.12 Or, the couple might have the test performed
preconception13—individuals advised that they were at risk of having a child
with a feared disease might take steps to avoid that outcome, e.g., pursue other
paths to parenthood such as adoption or, perhaps, using in vitro fertilization

8. Kate Wevers, Prenatal Torts and Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, 24 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 257, 267 (2010) (“Most wrongful life and wrongful birth suits allege post-pregnancy
negligence.”). Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Iowa 2017) (“In a
wrongful-birth action, parents of a child born with a detectable birth defect allege that they would have
avoided conception or terminated the pregnancy but for the physician’s negligent failure to inform
them of the likelihood of the birth defect.”) (citing Keel v. Banach, 624 So.2d 1022, 1024 (Ala. 1993)).
9. See Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 343 (N.H. 1986); see also Procanik ex rel. Procanik v. Cillo,
478 A.2d 755, 759 (N.J. 1984).
10. Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Delaware Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 289 (Del. Supr. 1989) (“Plaintiffs
allege that defendants improperly performed a medical procedure known as amniocentesis and
negligently delayed informing the plaintiff parents of the results of the chromosome study so that
plaintiffs did not learn of the test results until the third trimester of the pregnancy.”).
11. Naccash v. Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 827 (Va. 1982) (“Ms. Green reported to the Burgers that
the test results showed Mr. Burger was not a Tay-Sachs carrier. Satisfied with the report, Mrs. Burger
‘went ahead and had’ her baby.”).
12. See id. (“Both Joseph and Trudy Burger testified that, had they known they were Tay-Sachs
carriers, they would have insisted upon an amniocentesis and, if that test showed the fetus was afflicted
with Tay-Sachs, Mrs. Burger would have had an abortion.”).
13. See Ginsberg ex rel. Ginsberg v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 117 A.3d 200, 210 (N.J. App. Div.
2015) (both husband and wife tested for Tay-Sachs prior to conceiving child, and father wrongly told
that he was not a carrier for the disease), aff’d, 147 A.3d 434 (N.J. 2016).
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(IVF) and then testing the pre-embryo14 prior to implantation to make sure that
the genetic difficulty had been avoided.15 Or, the couple might make use of
someone else’s gametes to avoid the genetic difficulties that would be posed
were the couple to use their own.16
Suppose that a patient takes medication to alleviate symptoms that she
experiences. She tells her doctor that she and her husband are considering
having children, so she wants to know whether her taking the medication during
pregnancy would pose any dangers to a developing fetus. Suppose further that
she is misinformed about the dangers posed by her taking the medication during
pregnancy, and that she and her husband have children with severe handicaps
attributable to the drug.17 Had the couple been correctly advised of the dangers
posed by the medication, they simply would have avoided conception.18
In the cases described above, the parents are not claiming that the medical
provider did something during the pregnancy that harmed the growing fetus,
e.g., exposed the fetus to X-rays.19 Rather, the parents are claiming that the

14. In re Marriage of Rooks, 429 P.3d 579, 582 (Colo. 2018) (“[W]e use the term ‘pre-embryos’
in this opinion to refer to eggs that have been fertilized using the IVF process but not implanted in a
uterus.”).
15. See Findley-Smith v. Smith, No. 01-07-00360-CV, 2008 WL 525813, at *6 (Tex. App. Feb.
28, 2008).
Dr. Joi M. Findley-Smith’s negligent failure to advise the patient of the possible
transmission of hydrocephalus to her baby and negligent failure to perform
genetic testing to rule out the risk deprived the patient of the opportunity to utilize
alternative paths to motherhood, such as adoption or in-vitro fertilization with
pre-implant genetic testing.
Id.
16. Cf. Paretta v. Med. Offs. for Hum. Reprod., 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (couple
uses donated ova to achieve pregnancy via IVF). A separate issue is whether use of those donated
gametes would itself pose genetic risks. See id. (“[A]vailable donor was a carrier of cystic fibrosis.”).
17. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 486 (Wash. 1983) (“Each of the three doctors
responded that Dilantin could cause cleft palate and temporary hirsutism.”). See also id. at 487 (“An
adequate literature search, or consulting other sources, would have yielded such information of material
risks associated with Dilantin in pregnancy that reasonably prudent persons in the position of the
Harbesons would attach significance to such risks in deciding whether to have further children.”). Id.
at 487 (“Each of the four Harbeson Plaintiffs has sustained permanent and severe damages and injuries
past, present and future, as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the Madigan physicians.”).
See also Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 10 (Mass. 1990) (upholding cause of action for negligent
preconception genetic counseling).
18. Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 494 (“The court made a finding of fact that had the Harbesons been
informed of those risks they would not have had any other children.”).
19. See Cox v. Dela Cruz, 406 A.2d 620, 621 (Me. 1979) (malpractice case involving doctor who
exposed pregnant woman to X-rays).

STRASSER_25JAN22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

302

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:297

medical provider deprived the parents of the opportunity either to make an
informed decision about whether to secure an abortion20 or about whether to
avoid conception in the first place.21 Further, the parents assert that they would
have acted differently had they been apprised of the relevant information in a
timely way.22
Merely because some couples would have chosen to abort a fetus had they
known that the fetus had a particular condition does not establish that all
couples would do so.23 For those parents who would not have acted any
differently even if they had known that the fetus had a particular condition, a
medical professional’s failure to provide the information early in the pregnancy
would not have provided the basis for a wrongful birth action. The negligent
failure to provide the information would not have caused the parents to forego
obtaining an abortion.24
Consider a couple inalterably opposed to abortion.25 Such a couple might
seek genetic counseling preconception, precisely because information at that

20. Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 66 (S.C. 2004).
A “wrongful birth” action is brought by the parent of a child born with an
impairment or birth defect. The parent alleges that the negligence of those
charged with prenatal testing or genetic counseling deprived them of the right to
make a timely decision regarding whether to terminate a pregnancy because of
the likelihood their child would be born physically or mentally impaired. The
birth defect or impairment itself occurred naturally, i.e., it was not directly caused
by an act or omission of the defendant health care provider.
Id.
21. See Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 486; Viccaro, 551 N.E.2d at 9.
22. See, for example, Thornhill v. Midwest Physician Ctr. of Orland Park, 787 N.E.2d 247, 253
(Ill. App. 2003) (“Plaintiff testified that if she had been informed of the correct AFP test results in July
1996, she would have terminated the pregnancy.”).
23. Jeffrey R. Botkin, Prenatal Diagnosis and the Selection of Children, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
265, 272 (2003) (“When prenatal diagnosis detects a fetus with a genetic condition or congenital
malformation, some parents choose to continue the pregnancy.”).
24. Cf. Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 408 (Iowa 2017) (“[P]roof of
causation will depend on a ‘counterfactual,’ or what the plaintiffs would have done if they had been
properly informed by their physicians.”); See also Darpana M. Sheth, Better Off Unborn? An Analysis
of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 73 TENN. L.
REV. 641, 666 (2006) (stating recovery is limited to cases where parents testify that they would have
aborted the child).
25. Cf. Marciniak v. Lundborg, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 62, 450 N.W.2d 243, 244 (Wis. 1990).
Mrs. Marciniak was asked at her deposition why she did not have an abortion.
She replied: “I could not kill a baby.” She was asked if there was anything in her
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point might affect whether they would try to conceive or instead try to adopt.
Misinforming such a couple prior to conception might provide the basis for a
wrongful birth action, whereas misinforming that couple during the pregnancy
would not.26 In both cases, the medical professional might have misinformed
the couple, but only in the preconception scenario would the couple have acted
differently had the professional not been negligent.27
i. On Promoting Stigma
Some commentators suggest that the legal recognition of wrongful birth
actions is stigmatizing either to the child born or to the disabled community as
a whole.28 The child himself or herself is allegedly stigmatized because the
wrongful birth tort requires the parent to affirm that (1) she would have avoided
conception or would have sought an abortion but for someone else’s
negligence, and (2) the parent had been harmed by the birth of the child.29 The

religion that disapproves of an abortion, and she replied: “I am Catholic.” She
did not consider giving the child up for adoption: “It was my child.”
Id.
26. Id. at 69–70.
27. Id.
28. Sofia Yakren, “Wrongful Birth” Claims and the Paradox of Parenting a Child with a
Disability, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 583, 590 (2018) (“Legal literature critiques wrongful birth
jurisprudence for harming the children at the center of these lawsuits . . . .”). Id. at 623 (“[T]he
language of ‘wrongful birth’ emphasizes the flawed child—perpetuating stigma and pain . . . .”).
Christina L. Goebelsmann, Putting Ethics and Traditional Legal Principles Back into California Tort
Law: Barring Wrongful-Birth Liability in Preimplantation Genetic Testing Cases, 43 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 667, 679 (2010).
The imposition of wrongful-birth liability could further validate the idea that "a
congenitally defective child [is] ‘tak[ing] up’ a place in a family that would
otherwise be filled by a 'normal child.’” Rather than acting as a positive moral
force, in such circumstances wrongful-birth liability would be promoting stigmas
based on genetic differences . . . .
Id. (footnotes omitted). Cf. Sheth, supra note 24, at 659 (“[A]lthough wrongful birth and wrongful life
claims provide some financial assistance to individual litigants, the overall impact of these claims is
negative because they threaten individuals with disabilities, as well as the larger disability
community.”); Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions,
40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 164 (2005) (“[A]ny benefits that wrongful birth and wrongful life
actions secure for the individual plaintiff come at the cost of demeaning and demoralizing antitherapeutic messages delivered to the community of people with disabilities and to greater society.”).
29. Yakren, supra note 28, at 596 (discussing “the very assertion the law requires: that, but for
the medical provider’s negligence, they would have aborted their child”). Id. at 587 (“What is unique,
and controversial, about a wrongful birth claim is that the parents’ alleged injury is inextricably linked
to the existence of their child.”).
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child aware of such testimony might feel grossly undervalued,30
notwithstanding the parent’s protestation of love for her child.31 The child
might further feel that she or he was taking up a spot in the family that the parent
wished had been filled by a different (more perfect) child.32
Yet, a parent bringing this cause of action is unlikely to be trying to make
her child feel unloved.33 Instead, the parent is probably trying to obtain
additional funds to help provide for that very child.34
The child who is the subject of a wrongful birth action may well be unable
to understand the alleged implications of the suit if only because of the child’s
inability to engage in sophisticated thinking.35 Even a child capable of
conceptualizing stigma might nonetheless view her parent bringing such an
action as seeking to secure additional resources rather than as attempting to
impose stigma.36 Finally, even were the child to feel stigmatized by the parent
bringing the cause of action, a separate question would be whether those
feelings of stigma would outweigh the therapeutic benefits afforded by the
treatment made possible by the money damages awarded.37
30. Sheth, supra note 24, at 660.
To establish causation for a wrongful birth or wrongful life claim, a mother must
testify that she would not have chosen to carry the child to term if she had been
informed of the defect in a timely manner. Such testimony is emotionally
crippling not only to the child suffering from physical or mental infirmities . . . .
Id.
31. Yakren, supra note 28, at 596 (“[P]arents seeking to recover for wrongful birth are
condemned for allegedly failing to love their children ‘unconditionally.’”). See, for example, id. at
586 (“In the months after A.J.’s birth, the Brancas traveled an emotionally fraught path—even as they
‘came to love A.J. deeply,’ they also filed ‘a multimillion-dollar lawsuit claiming that Donna Branca’s
obstetrician’s poor care deprived her of the right to abort him.’”).
32. Goebelsmann, supra note 28, at 679.
33. Yakren, supra note 28, at 598 (describing parents who had brought a wrongful birth action
who nonetheless had “love[d] their child more than anything”).
34. See Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 407 (Iowa 2017) (suggesting
that affording compensation may help parents be able to provide for their child’s needs); Sheth, supra
note 24, at 659 (discussing the possible financial benefit that might accrue from such a suit); Hensel,
supra note 28, at 164 (same). See also Yakren, supra note 28, at 601 (“[M]ost parents who launch
wrongful birth suits do so ‘to guarantee care for their children.’”).
35. Yakren, supra note 28, at 593 (noting that “the child at issue in a wrongful birth suit . . . [may
be] unable to comprehend the nature of the claim due to youth or impairment . . . .”).
36. See Lininger ex rel. Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1207 (Colo. 1988) (discussing
“speculation about [the] stigma that he [the child] might suffer.”).
37. Id. (“We fail to see how the parents’ recovery of extraordinary medical and educational
expenses, so as to minimize the detrimental effect of the child’s impairment, is outweighed by any
speculation about stigma that he might suffer.”).
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Some commentators suggest that whether or not the child feels stigmatized
by his or her parents bringing such an action, the state’s recognition of wrongful
birth actions stigmatizes the disabled community as a whole.38 This criticism
might be understood in at least two different ways: (1) by recognizing a separate
cause of action for wrongful birth, the state sends a stigmatizing message,39 or
(2) by permitting the recovery of damages at least partially based on a child
having been born with a disability, the state sends a stigmatizing message.40
The first way of understanding the criticism—the state sends a stigmatizing
message by recognizing a separate tort for negligence resulting in the birth of a
child with handicaps—seems accurate and captures something important. The
state does not have to create a separate tort for negligence resulting in a child
with disabilities but could instead include the kinds of alleged wrongdoing at
issue in wrongful birth actions within medical negligence claims as a general
matter.41 That way, the state would not be suggesting that negligence resulting
38. See Plowman, 896 N.W.2d at 406–07 (“Defendants argue that allowing wrongful-birth
claims will stigmatize the disabled community.”); Sheth, supra note 24, at 659 (suggesting that
whatever financial benefits are accrued is outweighed by the overall impact of the recognition of such
claims); Hensel, supra note 28, at 164; Yakren, supra note 28, at 587 (“Scholars have argued that the
‘wrongful birth ’message, openly voiced by the mother of a living child, is stigmatizing to the entire
disability community.”).
39. James Bopp, Jr., Barry A. Bostrom & Donald A. McKinney, The “Rights” and “Wrongs”
of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: A Jurisprudential Analysis of Birth Related Torts, 27 DUQ. L.
REV. 461, 515 (1989) (“It is this implicit inescapable prejudice against individuals with disabilities in
particular . . . that pervades the wrongful birth/life rationale. . . . [T]his categorical prejudgment of the
worth of others . . . should [not] be clothed with the dignity of law through the recognition of wrongful
birth and wrongful life claims.”).
40. Meghan Boone, Reproductive Due Process, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 511, 564 (2020)
(“[C]ourts are often very reluctant to award tort damages for wrongful birth or similar claims, for fear
of what such damages might say about the value of human life.”).
41. Billauer, supra note 6, at 93 (suggesting that both wrongful births and wrongful pregnancy
should be understood to fall within medical negligence actions more generally). See Garrison by
Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Delaware Inc., 571 A.2d 786, *2 (Del. 1989).
Rather than describing the parents’ claim as a cause of action for “wrongful
birth,” we choose to characterize the alleged tort as an act or acts of negligence
or medical malpractice involving the negligent performance of a medical
procedure in combination with negligent delay in transmitting the results of the
diagnostic tests to the parents. The resultant injury to the parents is that they have
arguably been required to incur, and may be required in the future to incur,
extraordinary expenses in the raising, care and education of their child, who
suffers from a genetic disorder.
Id. Cf. Provencio v. Wenrich, 261 P.3d 1089, 1092 (N.M. 2011) (“[W]rongful conception is not a
distinct tort. It is well-established among courts and scholars that wrongful conception sounds in the
law of medical negligence.”).
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in the birth of a child with handicaps involves such distinct and palpable harm
that it should be treated as a separate and distinct tort. Indeed, it is not at all
clear why the wrongful birth tort was defined as one involving a child born with
handicaps rather than in some other way.42 For example, wrongful birth might
instead have focused on whether the alleged negligence occurred pre- or postconception or, perhaps, on whether the parent wanted to have a child.43 The
state having defined the tort by focusing on the child’s condition rather than on
the tortfeasor’s negligence or some other feature of the case is regrettable.44
The tort would be less stigmatizing if defined differently,45 notwithstanding that
damages might still include the costs associated with the extraordinary care that
a child with severe handicaps might require in order to thrive.46
The second way of understanding the stigma criticism is that the state’s
awarding of damages for the birth of a child with handicaps is itself stigmatizing
for the disabled community, as a whole.47 Yet, the force of that argument is
much greater than seems to be appreciated. Consider, for example, a plaintiff
who sues for damages after becoming paralyzed because of someone else’s
negligence.48 Permitting compensation in that context might also be said to be
undermining the disabled community, because awarding damages in that
context would involve the recognition that the plaintiff had been harmed as a

42. Billauer, supra note 6, at 95 (discussing “commentators [who] use the term ‘wrongful birth’
to refer to parental claims incident to birthing an unwanted child, healthy or not”).
43. See id. at 95–96. See also Yakren, supra note 28, at 622 (suggesting “[r]eframing the
wrongful birth claim as a loss of choice and control over procreation . . . .”).
44. See Yakren, supra note 28, at 588 (“Scholars have further contended that courts stigmatize
disability by labeling, framing, and compensating harm differently when parents have a ‘healthy’ child
due to a medical provider’s failure to perform a proper sterilization or abortion.”).
45. Billauer, supra note 6, at 99 (“An alternative approach to addressing the situation, which also
enlarges the scope of recovery, is to plainly call all these cases malpractice and hold the defendants to
the general negligence/malpractice standard.”).
46. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 349 (N.H. 1986) (“[I]n most jurisdictions the parents may
recover only the extraordinary medical and educational costs attributable to the birth defects.”).
47. Hensel, supra note 28, at 174 (“Wrongful birth and life actions transmit a potentially
powerful message to all people with disabilities: as a matter of law, your impairment, standing alone,
is a sufficient basis upon which to evaluate the quality of your life.”). See also Sheth, supra note 24,
at 660 (“Wrongful birth and wrongful life claims are demoralizing to the disability community because
they convey the message that an individual with a disability is inherently deficient.”).
48. See, for example, Sw. Emergency Physicians, P.C. v. Quinney, 819 S.E.2d 696, 698 (Ga.
App. 2018) (alleging that the failure “to provide Quinney with proper medical treatment while he was
in the emergency department of the hospital . . . resulted in Quinney suffering irreversible
paraplegia.”).
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result of the defendant’s negligence.49 The same point might be made with
respect to others who seek compensation because the negligent defendant
caused the plaintiff to become deaf or blind.50
Commentators suggesting that individual wrongful birth damages should
not be awarded because awarding such damages undermines the disabled
community by making value judgments about differing lives would seem
committed to the proposition that individual damages should not be awarded as
a general matter because doing so would undermine the disabled community
by making value judgments about differing lives.51 One would not expect such
a commentator to suggest that someone who has become quadriplegic as a
result of someone else’s negligence (e.g., in an auto accident) has suffered a
“real loss” and thus should be compensated.52 The analysis of the auto accident
example suggests that the injured person deserves compensation as a result of
having been made worse off, which is allegedly the very kind of value judgment
that some of the wrongful birth critics maintain must not be made.53
One can affirm the inherent dignity54 and value of the differently abled
community without denying that an individual has been harmed after having

49. Cf. Jillian T. Stein, Backdoor Eugenics: The Troubling Implications of Certain Damages
Awards in Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Claims, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1117, 1118 (2010)
(suggesting that by recognizing wrongful birth actions, the state is making a value judgment when
comparing the lives of the disabled and the non-disabled).
50. Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 1279, 1282 (Ind. 1990) (“Certainly, one who gains great
pleasure from listening to music deserves compensation for loss of that pastime if a defendant’s
negligence renders him deaf.”). See, for example, Walters v. Frakes, 953 N.W.2d 831, 840 (Neb. App.
2021) (“The inmate eventually sued the government and alleged that the negligence of the
government’s prison employees in not reporting his complaints resulted in the delay in diagnosis and
caused his blindness.”).
51. Cf. Hensel, supra note 28, at 194 (“The hard fought gains secured by the disability rights
movement should not be placed at risk in the drive for individual compensation.”).
52. See id. at 176. See also Sheth, supra note 24, at 647 (distinguishing wrongful birth cases
“from prenatal injury cases in which the child would have been born healthy were it not for the
defendant’s negligent act committed in utero”).
53. See Stein, supra note 49, at 1118 (suggesting that that state should not make such value
judgments).
54. See Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Human Rights, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 775, 792 (2013)
(“[A]ll human beings—even infants and the severely mentally disabled—have inherent dignity.”)
(emphasis omitted); Dr. Jacqueline Laing, Information Technology and Biometric Databases:
Eugenics and Other Threats to Disability Rights, 3 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 9, 19 (2008)
(discussing “the inherent dignity of every person however disabled he or she might be”).
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lost capacities as a result of someone else’s negligence.55 Further, one can argue
that the tort system undermines the disabled community without precluding
recovery for incapacitation due to someone else’s negligence.56 While
commentators might rightly criticize states for creating a separate and distinct
tort based on a child’s having been born with disabilities, the arguments
sometimes asserted as a basis for rejecting wrongful birth claims (that awarding
any damages would stigmatize the differently abled community) would, if taken
seriously, require substantial revision of the tort system as a general matter.
ii. On Promoting Abortion
Some states are unwilling to award damages in a wrongful birth cause of
action to any plaintiff who claims that a medical professional’s negligence
caused the plaintiff to forego the opportunity to make an informed decision
about whether to abort her pregnancy. Such a claim might be predicated on a
medical practitioner having negligently failed to detect or disclose that the
developing fetus had certain serious health issues. In these kinds of cases, the
plaintiff asserts that if she had been informed in a timely manner of the fetus’s
condition, she would not have carried the pregnancy to term.
Grubbs ex rel. Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., P.S.C. involved
“whether the parents of a child born with incurable and profound birth defects
have a cause of action against a physician for failing to correctly diagnose
and/or inform them of the fetal medical condition in time for an abortion.”57
The Kentucky Supreme Court explained that it was “unwilling to equate the
loss of an abortion opportunity resulting in a genetically or congenitally
impaired human life, even severely impaired, with a cognizable legal injury.”58
Regrettably, the Grubbs court was not clear about why such a claim was not
cognizable. The would-be plaintiff has in effect been precluded from making

55. See Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in “Wrongful Life” Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
505, 510 n.21 (1991) (“While society rightly insists that persons suffering from handicaps possess
equal dignity and humanity, to date society has not expressed a preference that encourages the birth of
children with genetic defects more strongly than the birth of healthy children.”). See id. (“The birth of
an impaired child evokes universal expressions of sympathy, an indication that, other things being
equal, society prefers healthy children at the same time it protects all children equally.”).
56. Anne Bloom & Paul Steven Miller, Blindsight: How We See Disabilities in Tort Litigation,
86 WASH. L. REV. 709, 715 (2011) (discussing how “tort litigation’s distorted perspective of disability
provides political and cultural legitimacy for harmful stereotypes about people with
disabilities . . . [which may] help to construct the experience of being disabled in our culture”).
57. 120 S.W.3d 682, 684 (Ky. 2003), as amended (Aug. 27, 2003).
58. Id. at 689.
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an informed choice about whether to exercise the fundamental right to abort.59
If the “right of every woman to choose whether to bear a child is . . . of
fundamental importance,”60 then one would expect that the deprivation of
something so highly valued would be compensable.
The Kentucky court might have been suggesting that life, even with a
congenital handicap, is so valuable for both the parent and the child that no
cause of action predicated on a birth could be recognized. Yet, Kentucky
recognizes a cause of action for preconception negligence resulting in the birth
of a child,61 and one would expect that the state would treat pre- and postconception negligence in the same way with respect to whether a cause of action
is legally cognizable.62
To clarify why the recognition of wrongful birth actions was offensive to
public policy, the Grubbs court quoted from a dissenting opinion in a case
decided by the New York Court of Appeals:
The heart of the problem in these cases is that the physician
cannot be said to have caused the defect. The disorder is
genetic and not the result of any injury negligently inflicted by
the doctor. In addition it is incurable and was incurable from
the moment of conception. Thus the doctor’s alleged negligent
59. See Plowman v. Fort Madison Cmty. Hosp., 896 N.W.2d 393, 403 (Iowa 2017) (“The
compensable injury in a wrongful-birth claim is the parents’ loss of the opportunity to make an
informed decision to terminate the pregnancy.”).
60. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 458 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61. See Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44, 49 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (permitting cause of
action for negligently performed vasectomy).
62. A separate issue might involve which damages would be recoverable under state law. Cf.
Schirmer v. Mt. Auburn Obstetrics & Gynecologic Assoc., Inc., 844 N.E.2d 1160, 1167 (Ohio 2006).
[W]e look to our decision in Johnson on the proper measure of damages in
situations in which a pregnancy occurs through alleged medical negligence
(wherein the parents’ decision to avoid pregnancy is impaired by the negligence
of another) and extend that decision to cover those situations in which a parent is
denied the opportunity for an informed decision-making process during
pregnancy because of alleged medical negligence. As in wrongful-pregnancy
cases, we find the “limited damages” rule applicable to wrongful-birth cases.
Damages are therefore limited to costs arising from the continuation of the
pregnancy after the negligent act and for the birth of the child.
Id. (citing Johnson v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1370 (1989) (paragraph 2 of
syllabus). Kentucky limits the damages that might be awarded for preconception negligence. See
Maggard, 627 S.W.2d at 48 (“[W]e hold that the damages are limited to the general and special
damages incidental to the pregnancy and birth, such as, pain and suffering, loss of consortium, medical
and hospital expenses, and loss of wages.”). See also Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky.
1983) (“[P]arents cannot recover damages based on the costs of raising a healthy but unexpected child
from a doctor following an unsuccessful sterilization procedure.”).

STRASSER_25JAN22.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

310

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[105:297

failure to detect it during prenatal examination cannot be
considered a cause of the condition by analogy to those cases
in which the doctor has failed to make a timely diagnosis of a
curable disease. The child’s handicap is an inexorable result
of conception and birth.63
Thus, the Kentucky court suggested that wrongful birth actions were not
cognizable because a negligent medical professional should not be held
responsible for a condition “caused” by nature.64 But the point that the
condition is congenital and incurable does not establish that the medical
professional played no causal role in the harm’s occurrence.65
The plaintiff parent is claiming that but for the physician’s negligence, the
parent would not have had a child with a disability. That is true, although not
because the parent would have had a child without a disability but, instead,
because the parent would not have had that child. So, too, consider the plaintiff
parent who sues because of preconception negligence resulting in the parent not
knowing that her child was at risk of being afflicted with a terrible disease.
When suing, the parent is not claiming that the genetic counselor did something
to cause the child to have the congenital disease. Rather, the parent is claiming
that but for the negligence the parent would not have had the child with the
debilitating disease because the parent would have chosen not to conceive.
If the state were suggesting that having a child, with or without handicaps,
is of incomparable value, then one would expect that no cause of action
predicated on the birth of a child would be cognizable, regardless of whether
the alleged negligence occurred pre- or post-conception. After all, if an
individual negligently causes another to receive a benefit of incomparable
value, the latter person cannot recover damages because the negligence resulted
in a boon rather than harm.66
An additional point about the Kentucky court’s reasoning should be noted,
namely, that a much different issue would have been presented if the court had
believed that the physician had played a causal role in the child having a

63. Grubbs, 120 S.W.3d at 689 (citing Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 816 (N.Y. 1978)
(Wachtler, J., dissenting)).
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Shelley A. Ryan, Wrongful Birth: False Representations of Women’s Reproductive
Lives, 78 MINN. L. REV. 857, 884–85 (1994) (“When courts conclude as a matter of law that emotional
harm damages are not recoverable under the ‘benefit/burden’ rule, they assume that in all wrongful
birth cases, the parents are better off because of the defendant’s negligence.”).
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disability.67 In cases where a medical professional has caused harm to a fetus,
e.g., by causing the fetus to be exposed to some harmful substance, the court
compares the life of the child with the handicap to what that child’s life would
have been like without the handicap.68 Courts making that comparison have
not been reluctant to permit damages to be awarded, as long as the harm was
foreseeable.69
The Kentucky Supreme Court is not the only state high court to refuse to
permit the awarding of wrongful birth damages where the plaintiff alleged that
the defendant’s negligence had resulted in the plaintiff’s loss of the opportunity
to make an informed abortion decision. The North Carolina Supreme Court
reached a similar result using similar reasoning in Azzolino v. Dingfelder.70
At issue in Azzolino was an allegation that “the defendants’ negligent
failure to advise the parents properly of the availability of amniocentesis and
genetic counseling and negligent prenatal care of the mother prevented the
termination of the mother’s pregnancy by abortion.”71 The Azzolino court cited
with approval the New York Court of Appeals dissenting opinion, also cited by
the Grubbs court,72 suggesting that nature rather than the defendants had been
responsible for the child’s condition.73 The North Carolina court emphasized
that in the case before it there had neither been an allegation that “the defendants

67. Cf. Rodriguez ex rel. Posso-Rodriguez v. Feinstein, 793 So.2d 1057, 1058 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (plaintiff permitted to try to establish that pregnant woman’s use of a drug caused her child
to have a particular condition at birth).
68. Doolan v. IVF Am. (MA), Inc., 12 Mass. L. Rptr. 482, No. 993476, 2000 WL 33170944 at
*4 (Mass. Super. 2000) (contrasting the instant case with other cases in which “the negligence of the
defendant caused the minor plaintiff to be born with severe defects, when he/she would have otherwise
been born healthy”). See also Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ind. 1992); Monusko v. Postle,
437 N.W.2d 367, 369–70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
69. See Hegyes v. Unjian Enters., Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 101 (Ct. App.); Reh’g denied and
opinion modified (Oct. 23, 1991).
Defendant’s conduct was not "likely to result” in plaintiff’s conception or birth,
let alone her alleged injuries nearly three years after the car accident. Unlike a
medical professional’s conduct which is directly and intentionally related to
whether a child is conceived or born, such conception or birth is not a reasonably
foreseeable result of the operation of a car.
Id.
70. 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1985).
71. Id. at 530.
72. See Grubbs ex rel. Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Ctr., P.S.C., 120 S.W.3d 682, 689
(Ky. 2003).
73. See Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d. at 536 (citing Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 816 (N.Y.
1978) (Wachtler, J. dissenting in part)).
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negligently injured a fetus,” nor that “the defendants in any way directly caused
the genetic defect.”74 The court then rejected that “life, even life with severe
defects, may ever amount to a legal injury.”75
The North Carolina position that life with severe defects does not amount
to legal injury needs to be unpacked. For example, the court might be
suggesting that there can be no cause of action where the claim is that
defendant’s negligence resulted in the plaintiff having a child with severe
disabilities, because “life, even life with severe defects, may [not] ever amount
to a legal injury.”76 But that would not account for North Carolina
jurisprudence.77
Suppose that a medical professional’s negligence occurred prior to
conception, and that negligence deprived the plaintiff of the ability to make an
informed decision about whether to conceive a child.78 Suppose further that the
preconception negligence involved a failure to give information in a timely
way, and that there was no contention that the medical professional in some
way caused the child’s condition in any way other than in having failed to
provide the relevant information in a timely way.79 In this kind of case, there
would be no contention that the defendant had “directly caused the genetic
defect,”80 and one would have assumed that Azzolino would control and that the
plaintiff’s tort action would be unsuccessful.
In McAllister v. Ha, the North Carolina Supreme Court refused to apply
Azzolino in a case involving preconception negligence resulting in a decision to
conceive and then to give birth to a child with foreseeable challenges.81 The
defendant physician failed to report to the plaintiffs the results of bloods tests
indicating that a child they conceived would have a one-in-four chance of
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 532, 534.
Id.
Id.
See generally id.
McAllister v. Ha, 496 S.E.2d 577, 582 (N.C. 1998).
In the case at bar, plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that defendant was negligent
in his failure to report the results of the blood tests he performed, that plaintiffs
were unable to make an informed choice regarding whether to conceive another
child as a result, and that plaintiff-wife did in fact become pregnant and give birth
to another child.

Id.
79. Id. See id. at 584 (“[T]he disorder in this case, sickle-cell disease . . . [is] not the result of
any injury negligently inflicted by . . . [the] defendant-doctor.”).
80. Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 534.
81. 496 S.E.2d 577, 582 (1998).
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having sickle-cell disease.82 The plaintiffs had claimed that they would have
avoided conception if they had been apprised of the relevant probabilities, i.e.,
that they would not have had the child but for the physician’s negligent failure
to inform them of the test results.83
The North Carolina Supreme Court expressly rejected that Azzolino
controlled such a case. “The complaint does not allege that plaintiffs’ son’s
very existence—the injury the Court declined to recognize in Azzolino—is an
injury for which they should be compensated. Thus, the claim is not one
precluded by Azzolino.”84 Basically, the court reasoned that this kind of case
was distinguishable from one in which the plaintiff claimed to have been denied
the opportunity to make an informed abortion decision, and thus was not
precluded by North Carolina law.85 But that interpretation of North Carolina
law focuses on the method by which the couple would have avoided having a
child with sickle-cell disease—abortion versus avoiding conception—and does
not suggest that “life, even life with severe defects, may [not] ever amount to a
legal injury.”86 Instead, the North Carolina approach refuses to award damages
based on the value of the lost opportunity to make an informed decision about
whether to abort.87
The Georgia Supreme Court offered an analysis that followed the lead
offered by the high courts of Kentucky and North Carolina. When explaining
that the state would not recognize wrongful birth actions, the Georgia court

82. Id. at 580 (“Plaintiffs allege that the traits carried by plaintiff-wife combined with the factor
carried by plaintiff-husband put the couple at a one-in-four risk of bearing a child with sickle-cell
disease.”).
83. Id. (“Plaintiffs further allege that because of defendant’s negligence, they never received any
genetic counseling to prepare them for being the parents of a child with sickle-cell disease and were
deprived of the opportunity to make an informed decision regarding whether to have another child.”).
84. Id. at 582.
85. See id. (“[T]he claim is not one precluded by Azzolino.”).
86. Azzolino, 337 S.E.2d at 534.
87. See McAllister, 496 S.E.2d 577. A related issue not discussed by the North Carolina Supreme
Court is whether a cause of action would lie if a woman secured an abortion because she had not been
fully informed about the fetus’s condition. Cf. Blackburn v. Blue Mountain Women’s Clinic, 951 P.2d
1, 4 (Mont. 1997).
Prior to the procedure, Blackburn told the Blue Mountain Clinic counselor that
she was seeking an abortion only because she feared her baby would be born HIV
positive. Blackburn claims neither the counselor, nor any nurse or doctor with
whom Blackburn spoke at any time prior to her abortion, explained to Blackburn
that an HIV negative mother could not deliver an HIV positive baby.
Id.
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noted that “the defendants cannot be said to have caused the impairment.”88
However, when offering that assessment, the court was not thereby indicating
that the state refused to recognize preconception torts.89 On the contrary, the
court admitted that wrongful pregnancy actions were recognized in the
jurisdiction.90
The caselaw suggests that a number of factors are in play in the prenatal
tort jurisprudence. Some jurisdictions are unwilling to recognize a cause of
action if that action is predicated on the plaintiff having lost the opportunity to
abort the pregnancy.91 Such an approach bars some wrongful birth/pregnancy
actions but not others. For instance, this approach does not bar a wrongful
birth/pregnancy clam that, but for the defendant’s negligence, there would have
been no pregnancy. However, this approach does bar a claim that, but for the
defendant’s negligence, the pregnancy would have been aborted.92

88. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 561 (Ga. 1990).
89. See id. at 563.
90. Id. at 559.
A "wrongful pregnancy” action is typically brought by the parents of a child
whose conception or birth is due to a physician’s negligent performance of a
sterilization or of an abortion. In Graves, this court aligned itself with the vast
majority of other jurisdictions in holding that such an action may be brought as
"no more than a species of malpractice.” The recovery of the plaintiff/parents in
Graves, however, was limited to the general and special damages incurred during
the pregnancy of the mother and the delivery of the child.
Id. (quoting Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (1984)) (citation
omitted).
91. Jurisdictions might adopt a different approach in cases in which an individual has been
advised inaccurately about the existence of a fetal condition resulting in a woman’s obtaining an
unnecessary abortion. Cf. Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538, 539
(N.Y. 1987) (permitting woman to bring cause of action predicated on her having obtained an abortion
after having been inaccurately informed that the child she was carrying would suffer from
microcephaly or anencephaly).
92. See generally Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 68 n.3 (S.C. 2004); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d
741, 742 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
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Some state legislatures93 and state supreme courts94 are quite clear about
their unwillingness to permit wrongful birth actions based on the claim that the
plaintiff was harmed because of a lost opportunity to make an informed

93. MO. REV. STAT. § 188.130(2) (2020) (“No person shall maintain a cause of action or receive
an award of damages based on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child would
have been aborted.”); MINN. STAT. § 145.424(2) (2020) (“No person shall maintain a cause of action
or receive an award of damages on the claim that but for the negligent conduct of another, a child
would have been aborted.”); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1906(a) (2020).
No civil action may be commenced in any court for a claim of wrongful life or
wrongful birth, and no damages may be recovered in any civil action for any
physical condition of a minor that existed at the time of such minor’s birth if the
damages sought arise out of a claim that a person’s action or omission contributed
to such minor’s mother not obtaining an abortion.
Id. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-741.12(B)(3) (2021).
“Wrongful birth action” means a cause of action that is brought by a parent or
other person who is legally required to provide for the support of a child, which
seeks economic or noneconomic damages because of a condition of the child that
existed at the time of the child’s birth, and which is based on a claim that a
person’s act or omission contributed to the mother’s not having obtained an
abortion.
Id. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-120-902(a) (West 2021) (“A person is not liable for damages in a civil
action for wrongful birth based on a claim that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a child
would not or should not have been born.”); IOWA CODE § 613.15B(1) (2021) (“A cause of action shall
not arise and damages shall not be awarded, on behalf of any person, based on a wrongful birth claim
that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a child would not or should not have been born.”);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2971(1) (2021) (“A person shall not bring a civil action on a wrongful birth
claim that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a child or children would not or should not have
been born.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-719A (2021) (“A person is not liable for damages in any
civil action for wrongful birth based on a claim that, but for an act or omission of the defendant, a child
or children would not or should not have been born.”). But see ME. STAT. tit. 24, § 2931(3) (2020)
(“Damages for the birth of an unhealthy child born as the result of professional negligence shall be
limited to damages associated with the disease, defect or handicap suffered by the child.”).
94. The North Carolina Supreme Court made clear that it believed wrongful birth tied up with
abortion in particular. See Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 531 (1985) (“‘Wrongful birth’
refers to the claim for relief of parents who allege that the negligent treatment or advice deprived them
of the choice of terminating pregnancy by abortion and preventing the birth of the defective child.”).
The Georgia Supreme Court reflected a similar view. See Etkind v. Suarez, 519 S.E.2d 210, 211 (Ga.
1999).
Throughout her pregnancy, Dr. Jennifer Etkind was a patient of Dr. Ramon
Suarez. After giving birth to a child with Down’s Syndrome, she and her husband
filed suit against Dr. Suarez and his partnership, asserting a “wrongful birth”
claim. Such a claim “is brought by the parents of an impaired child and alleges
basically that, but for the treatment or advice provided by the defendant, the
parents would have aborted the fetus, thereby preventing the birth of the child.”
Id. (citing Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Grp. v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 559 (Ga. 1990).
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abortion decision. Such a refusal has not been viewed as burdening abortion
rights in an unconstitutional way.95 But states limiting wrongful birth actions
when the plaintiff asserts that but for defendant’s negligence she would have
aborted96 suggests that some state limitations on wrongful birth actions have
more to do with attitudes about abortion than about other possible attitudes.97
B. Wrongful Pregnancy
A wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception claim also alleges that a
child would not have been born but for the negligence of some medical
professional.98 However, there is an important difference between wrongful
pregnancy and wrongful birth cases in that the former kind of case does not
involve a serious condition that the medical professional failed to discover or
discuss.
The South Carolina Supreme Court defined wrongful pregnancy in the
following way:
A “wrongful pregnancy” or “wrongful contraception” action is
brought by the parent of a healthy but unplanned child, seeking
damages from a health care provider who allegedly was
negligent in performing a sterilization procedure or abortion,
or from a pharmacist or pharmaceutical manufacturer who
allegedly was negligent in dispensing or manufacturing a
95. Etkind, 519 S.E.2d at 213 (“This holding does not violate the constitutional rights of the
parents of an impaired child, because the refusal to recognize a wrongful birth claim absent authorizing
legislation does not constitute undue interference by Georgia in the exercise of the right to elect to have
an abortion.”). See also id. at 213 (“Nothing in Casey holds that the Federal Constitution compels the
states to recognize a woman’s right to bring a civil suit against her obstetrician for the negligent failure
to assist her in making an informed abortion decision.”). But see Hickman v. Grp. Health Plan, Inc.,
396 N.W.2d 10, 19 (Minn. 1986) (Amdahl, C.J., dissenting) (“The legislature’s removal of the
negligence action safeguard, while not preventing a woman from actually obtaining an abortion, does
harm the complete exercise of a woman’s rights under Roe.”).
96. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 723 (Minn. 2004).
The statute bars claims that but for the negligence, the pregnancy would have
been aborted. Molloy makes no claim that she would have aborted M.M. if she
had more accurate information about S.F.’s genetic condition. Rather, Molloy’s
complaint alleges that “[h]ad [she and her husband] known that [S.F.] had Fragile
X, they would not have conceived [M.M.].” This states an action not for wrongful
life or birth, but rather for wrongful conception—an action that has been
recognized in this state for over a quarter century.
Id. (citations omitted).
97. Cf. Hensel, supra note 28, at 194 (“The hard fought gains secured by the disability rights
movement should not be placed at risk in the drive for individual compensation.”).
98. See Walker by Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 736 (Ariz. 1990).
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contraceptive prescription or device.99
The name of the tort is somewhat misleading. An individual bringing such
a claim need not assert that the conception or pregnancy was wrongful, i.e.,
would not have occurred but for the defendant’s negligence.100 Instead, the
plaintiff might be claiming that the pregnancy would not have continued to term
but for the defendant’s negligence.101 Characterizing the claim as that there
would have been no pregnancy resulting in a live birth but for the defendant’s
negligence includes cases in which the pregnancy would never have occurred
but for the defendant’s negligence102 and cases in which the pregnancy would
never have continued but for the defendant’s negligence.103
There is yet another respect in which the name of this tort is misleading.
Wrongful pregnancy and wrongful conception claims involve a healthy child
who would not have been born but for the defendant’s alleged negligence.104
Consider, for example, a couple who cannot support an additional child
because the couple is not wealthy and already has several children.105 One
member of the couple is sterilized.106 If the sterilization is performed
improperly, the couple might end up having another child, inability to provide
for that additional child notwithstanding.
In most, but not all, of the states recognizing wrongful pregnancy actions,
damages are limited to those associated with the pregnancy107 and the plaintiffs
99. Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 66 (S.C. 2004) (citing Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415, 417 nn.
2–3 (Fla.1992)).
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See Johnson v. Univ. Hosps. of Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1370 (Ohio 1989) (wrongful
pregnancy action based on negligent sterilization).
103. Miller v. Johnson, 343 S.E.2d 301, 302 (Va. 1986) (wrongful pregnancy actions based on
negligently performed abortions).
104. Parents in the wrongful pregnancy cases are not usually accused of attempting to stigmatize
their children. Cf. Marciniak v. Lundborg, 153 Wis. 2d 59, 67, 450 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Wis. 1990)
(“The parents’ suit for recovery of child rearing costs is in no reasonable sense a signal to the child that
the parents consider the child an unwanted burden.”).
105. Id. at 67 (“Individuals often seek sterilization precisely because the burdens of raising a
child are substantial and they are not in a position to incur them.”).
106. Id. at 62 (“In 1981, Paula Marciniak, wife of Douglas Marciniak, underwent a sterilization
operation to avoid having further children.”).
107. Miller, 343 S.E.2d at 305.
The mother, therefore, may recover damages, if proven, for medical expenses,
pain and suffering, and lost wages for a reasonable period, directly resulting from
the negligently performed abortion, the continuing pregnancy, and the ensuing
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are not permitted to recover the costs of raising the child.108 Many of the courts
precluding child-rearing damages reason that the birth of a healthy child
outweighs whatever costs might be accrued in raising that child.109
The wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy jurisprudence offers a few
lessons. While negligence resulting in the birth of a healthy child is actionable,
most states limit the damages that may be awarded to those occurring before
the birth, reasoning that recoverable damages should not include the ordinary
costs of raising a child.110 Where negligence results in the birth of a child with
severe challenges, the state response is more complicated. Many states permit
the recovery of the extraordinary costs associated with raising a child with a
severe disability.111 However, some states are reluctant to permit the imposition
of damages where the negligence solely involves a failure to inform a patient
in a timely way of important information, reasoning that in such cases the
negligent individual did not play a causal role in the child having the (possibly
congenital) condition.112 Such states may also be reluctant to award damages
where the harm was predicated upon a lost opportunity to abort.113 These
justifications for prohibiting or limiting damages are controversial and in any

childbirth. The mother is also entitled under the general rule to recover damages,
if proven, for emotional distress causally resulting from the tortiously caused
physical injury.
Id.
108. Id. at 307 (“[T]he costs of rearing a reasonably healthy child to majority are not recoverable
in a wrongful pregnancy or wrongful conception action.”). But see Univ. of Ariz. Health Scis. Ctr. v.
Superior Ct., 667 P.2d 1294, 1299 (Ariz. 1983).
[T]he preferable rule is that followed by the courts which, although permitting
the trier of fact to consider both pecuniary and non-pecuniary elements of damage
which pertain to the rearing and education of the child, also require it to consider
the question of offsetting the pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits which the
parents will receive from the parental relationship with the child.
Id.
109. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 722 (Ala. 1982) (“The birth of a healthy child, and
the joy and pride in rearing that child, are benefits on which no price tag can be placed. This joy far
outweighs any economic loss that might be suffered by the parents.”) (citing Wilbur v. Kerr, 628
S.W.2d 568, 570 (Ark. 1982)); Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Ky. 1983) (“The parents of a
normal healthy child whom they now love have not suffered any injury or damage. The benefits
conferred by the child’s existence clearly outweigh any economic burden involved.”).
110. Schork, 648 S.W.2d at 863; Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44, 48 (Ky. Ct. App.
1981).
111. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 349 (N.H. 1986).
112. Miller, 343 S.E.2d at 307; Univ. of Ariz. Health Scis. Ctr, 667 P.2d at 1299.
113. Molloy v. Meier, 679 N.W.2d 711, 723 (Minn. 2004).
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event are not triggered in many of the other kinds of cases involving pre-birth
negligence.114
III. OTHER KINDS OF CLAIMS INVOLVING PRE-BIRTH NEGLIGENCE
Negligence can occur pre-birth in a variety of contexts. Negligent actions
either pre- or post-conception might result in a child being born with severe
disabilities. However, the kinds of negligence cases discussed in this section
differ from the paradigmatic wrongful birth cases in that the negligence does
not merely involve a failure to apprise the couple of important information in a
timely way.115 Instead, the negligent actor does something causing a child to
have the disability—had there been no negligence, a child without the disability
would (presumably) have been born. Many states permit liability to be imposed
in these kinds of cases.116
A. The Rh Factor Cases
Cases in several states have involved the negligent failure to take
appropriate steps when dealing with a patient who has Rh-negative blood. The
adverse consequences that result may manifest in children not yet conceived,
and states have nonetheless imposed liability for the severe consequences that
have sometimes occurred.
Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital is a seminal case establishing the liability
of individuals who fail to take account of the adverse consequences that can
occur when Rh-negative blood is sensitized by Rh-positive blood.117 A
thirteen-year-old girl who had Rh-negative blood was negligently exposed to
Rh-positive blood on two different occasions, resulting in the sensitization of
her blood.118 The difficulty came to light eight years later during a routine

114. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
115. McAllister v. Ha, 496 S.E.2d 577, 580, 582 (N.C. 1998).
116. See id.
117. 367 N.E.2d 1250 (Ill. 1977).
118. Id. at 1251 (“Plaintiff’s six-count complaint for negligence and willful and wanton
misconduct alleges that in October of 1965, when her mother was 13 years of age, the defendants, on
two occasions, negligently transfused her mother with 500 cubic centimeters of Rh-positive blood.”).
Id.
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prenatal screening.119 The fetal exposure to the sensitized blood allegedly
caused a variety of serious harms.120
The Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that because negligently caused harm
to a previable fetus is actionable, it would be “illogical to bar relief for an act
done prior to conception where the defendant would be liable for this same
conduct had the child, unbeknownst to him, been conceived prior to his act.”121
The court held that “there is a right to be born free from prenatal injuries
foreseeably caused by a breach of duty to the child’s mother.”122
The Renslow court understood that opening up liability to those not yet
conceived would leave open whether, for example, liability might extend across
several generations.123 But the court noted that “the case at bar is clearly
distinguishable . . . [both because the] damage alleged is not, by its nature, selfperpetuating . . . [and because] the plaintiff [is not] a remote descendant.”124
Thus, while different courts might draw the line in different places with respect
to who may recover from preconception tortious conduct,125 the Illinois
Supreme Court suggested that the instant case did not involve a close case.
119. Id. (“In December 1973 she first discovered her condition when a routine blood screening
was ordered by her physician in the course of prenatal care.”).
120. Id.
Plaintiff was born on March 25, 1974, jaundiced and suffering from
hyperbilirubinemia. She required an immediate, complete exchange transfusion
of her blood and another such transfusion shortly thereafter. It is further alleged
that, as a result of the defendants’ acts, plaintiff suffers from permanent damage
to various organs, her brain, and her nervous system.
Id.
121. Id. at 1255 (“The cases allowing relief to an infant for injuries incurred in its previable state
make it clear that a defendant may be held liable to a person whose existence was not apparent at the
time of his act.”).
122. Id.
123. Id. (“The defendants . . . raise the specter of successive generations of plaintiffs
complaining against a single defendant for harm caused by genetic damage done an ancestor in a
nuclear accident.”).
124. Id.
125. Compare Enright ex rel. Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 553 N.Y.S.2d 494, 497 (1990), aff’d as
modified, 570 N.E.2d 198 (1991).
Although plaintiff is not a “DES daughter”—one who was exposed to DES while
in utero—she may be no less a victim of the devastation wrought by DES than
her mother, who is a DES daughter, and we see no sound basis for denying
plaintiff her day in court along with her mother.
with Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ohio 1992).
Even if knowledge of the drug’s “dangerous propensities” is sufficient to create
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Several other states have employed similar reasoning to reach similar
conclusions.126 Those cases have involved somewhat different factual
scenarios.127
When a mother with Rh-negative blood is carrying an Rh-positive fetus,
there is a risk of exposure and sensitization. That sensitization can be prevented
if the drug RhoGAM is administered during the pregnancy and delivery of the
child.128 However, once the mother’s blood has become sensitized, the
administration of RhoGAM will not bring about desensitization.129
Walker v. Rinck involved an Rh-negative woman (Judith Walker) who had
given birth to an Rh-positive child.130 No RhoGAM was administered because
test results erroneously indicated that the mother was Rh positive,

liability to the women exposed to the drug in utero, this same knowledge does
not automatically justify the extension of liability to those women’s children. It
is one thing to say that knowledge of a propensity to harm the reproductive organs
is sufficient to impose liability for a variety of different injuries to the
reproductive organs. It is yet another thing to say that this generalized knowledge
is sufficient to impose liability for injuries to a third party that occur twenty-eight
years later.
(footnotes omitted).
126. See generally Empire Cas. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1191 (Colo.
1988). Physician misreported blood type of mother and did not administer RhoGAM. Subsequently,
the mother became sensitized, and injuries were found in her later conceived children. The Court
described the cause of action as “an ordinary prenatal injury tort.” Id. Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d
367, 369–70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that failing to administer a rubella test and to immunize
a woman during her child-bearing years gave rise to a cause of action by a post-conceived child who
was born with injuries from rubella); Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So.2d 1151, 1157 (La. 1988)
(“Logic and sound policy require a recognition of a legal duty to a child not yet conceived but
foreseeably harmed by the negligent delivery of health care services to the child's parents.”).
127. See id.
128. Yeager v. Bloomington Obstetrics & Gynecology, Inc., 585 N.E.2d 696, 697 (Ind. Ct. App.
1992) (“RhoGAM can prevent an Rh-negative woman from developing the sensitivity to Rh-positive
blood when administered during the pregnancy and delivery of her first Rh-positive child.”) aff’d, 604
N.E.2d 598 (Ind. 1992). See also Lough ex rel Lough v. Rolla Women’s Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851,
852 (Mo. 1993) (“The drug RhoGAM is designed specifically to prevent what occurred to Tyler.
Administered within 72 hours of a woman giving birth to a child with an Rh factor different from hers,
RhoGAM suppresses the mother’s immune system response, preventing the sensitization that harmed
Tyler.”).
129. Lee v. Williams, 420 P.3d 88, 92 (Utah Ct. App. 2018) (“To protect against Rhsensitization, doctors can administer an injectable medication called RhoGAM, which Williams
testified significantly reduces the risk of Rh-sensitization. RhoGAM is preventative; that is, it can only
prevent Rh-sensitization, and cannot undo the sensitization once it has occurred.”).
130. Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 592 (Ind. 1992) (“Mrs. Walker had Rh negative blood
and the child had Rh positive blood . . . .”).
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notwithstanding that Walker had expressly warned her doctor that her blood
was Rh negative.131
Walker subsequently gave birth to other children, some of whom had Rhpositive blood.132 The Rh-positive children contended that they suffered harms
as a result of the negligent failure to administer RhoGAM.133 The Indiana
Supreme Court noted:
No one would seriously contend that an infant could not
recover for injuries sustained as a result of a defective product,
such as an automobile, manufactured prior to the conception of
the infant. In those situations, as here, the wrongful conduct
occurred prior to the conception of the infant plaintiff.134
The Walker court reasoned that the duty to Walker arose from the contract
she had with her physician.135 That duty may be extended to the beneficiaries
of the agreement and, here, the beneficiaries of the agreement were her future
children.136 Further, the very injuries that occurred were the kind that would
foreseeably result from the failure to administer RhoGAM.137
The Missouri Supreme Court also held that a negligent failure to administer
RhoGAM was actionable, notwithstanding that the child had not yet been
conceived at the time of the negligence.138 The court emphasized that the harms
due to the negligence were foreseeable and that the physician–patient
relationship between the mother and physician was also meant to protect future

131. Id. (“Dr. Rinck ordered blood tests from Lake Ridge. Those tests erroneously reported that
Mrs. Walker had Rh positive blood.”). Id. (“Mrs. Walker, who was a nurse, informed Dr. Rinck that
she had Rh negative blood.”).
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 594.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 595 (“Here, the Walker children were the beneficiaries of the consensual relationship
between their mother and Dr. Rinck, and Dr. Rinck had actual knowledge that the only reason for the
administration of RhoGAM was for the benefit of future children who may be born to Mrs. Walker.”).
See also Lough v. Rolla Women’s Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. 1993) (“Foreseeability is
the paramount factor in determining existence of a duty, but a relationship between the parties where
one is acting for the benefit of another also plays a role.”) (citing Hoover’s Dairy, Inc., v. Mid–America
Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426, 432 (Mo. 1985) (en banc)).
137. Walker, 604 N.E.2d at 595 (“It can hardly be argued that the injuries suffered by the Walker
children were not foreseeable when the medical reason to give RhoGAM to their mother was to prevent
the exact injuries which they allege occurred.”).
138. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 852.
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children.139 The negligent failure to administer the RhoGAM resulted in the
very harms that RhoGAM was designed to prevent.140
The Missouri court offered the following hypothetical to illustrate why the
tort should not be barred merely because the child had not yet been conceived
at the time the negligence occurred.
Assume a balcony is negligently constructed. Two years later,
a mother and her one-year-old child step onto the balcony and
it gives way, causing serious injuries to both the mother and
the child. It would be ludicrous to suggest that only the mother
would have a cause of action against the builder but, because
the infant was not conceived at the time of the negligent
conduct, no duty of care existed toward the child.141
Here, the harms were even more foreseeable and particularized. The
mother must receive the RhoGAM shortly after the birth of her child precisely
because future children would be at risk if her blood became sensitized.142 The
relevant issue was not whether she had future children with her current husband
or, instead, with a different husband should she divorce and remarry, i.e., the
relevant issue did not involve the particular chromosomes of the harmed
children.143 Rather, the important issue was preventing any possible children
that she might bear from being at risk of the severe difficulties that might result
were the mother not treated with RhoGAM in a timely way.144
B. Other Kinds of Cases
In the Rh factor cases, the failure to administer a drug causes the mother’s
blood to become sensitized, which puts at risk any future children that she might
139. Id. at 854 (“[A] relationship between the parties where one is acting for the benefit of
another also plays a role.”) (citing Hoover’s Dairy, Inc., 700 S.W.2d at 432). See also Lynch v.
Scheininger, 744 A.2d 113, 126 (N.J. 2000).
We reject the contention advanced by some that the physician whose negligence
gives rise to the claim owes no duty to a child not yet conceived. In the fields of
obstetrics and gynecological surgery, the relationship between a physician’s
responsibilities and the possibility of consequences to the mother that affect
future pregnancies is well understood.
Id.
140. Lough, 866 S.W.2d at 853 (“Indeed, the very reason for the RhoGAM treatment is to benefit
later conceived children of the mother, while injury to those children in the absence of proper treatment
is highly predictable.”) (citing Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital, 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (Ill. 1977)).
141. Id. at 854.
142. Id. at 852.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 852.
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bear.145 So, too, the failure to administer a rubella vaccine to a woman of childbearing age might put at risk any children that the non-vaccinated woman might
bear were she to contract rubella during her pregnancy.146
At issue in Monusko v. Postle was a negligent failure to administer a rubella
vaccine to a woman of child-bearing age by her OB/GYN doctors.147 The
woman later contracted rubella while pregnant, and the child born suffered the
foreseeable effects from rubella exposure in utero.148 The Monusko court
rejected the suggestion that liability could not be imposed because the
negligence occurred prior to the child’s conception, reasoning that the
“plaintiff . . . , while not specifically contemplated, would have been the
beneficiary of a test and immunization procedure specifically designed to
alleviate the harm which resulted in this case.”149 Further, it did not matter
whether the child born was the child of the patient and the man who was her
husband at the time of the negligent failure to administer the rubella vaccine or,
instead, the child of the patient and a different husband—the child’s particular
chromosomes did not play a role in whether the doctors were liable for their
negligence.150
An additional point might be made about Monusko. The tort damages were
sought by the child, Andrea.151 But the doctors’ negligence in failing to test for
or immunize against rubella occurred primarily during Jill Monusko’s
pregnancy when she was carrying her daughter, Loretta.152 The negligence was
145. Id.
146. See Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 368 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
147. Id. (patient never tested nor immunized for rubella during several visits by OB/GYN
doctors). But see McNulty v. McDowell, 613 N.E.2d 904, 907 (Mass. 1993) (“The fact that McDowell
was a[n] obstetrician-gynecologist and thus concerned with the health of his patients’ reproductive
systems does not, in itself, impose an affirmative duty on him to do everything possible to protect the
health of a child not yet conceived, planned, or intended.”); see also id. (noting that in Monusko, the
patient had indicated that she was planning on having another child).
148. Monusko, 437 N.W.2d at 368 (“Andrea Monusko was born on February 10, 1980, in a
severely impaired physical and mental condition, suffering from rubella syndrome.”).
149. Id. at 369–70 (“We hold that defendants owed a duty to Andrea, even though she was not
conceived at the time of the alleged wrongful act.”).
150. The court noted that the vaccine was to prevent harms to children as a general matter rather
than, for example, the children that the patient might have had with the man who was her husband at
the time the negligence occurred. See id. at 370 (“[T]he test and the preconception immunization are
specifically designed to prevent rubella syndrome in children that are not yet conceived.”).
151. Id. at 367–68 (“Count I seeks damages for plaintiff Andrea Monusko for a preconception
tort.”).
152. Id. at 368.
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tied to Andrea in that Jill Monusko had an intrauterine device (IUD) removed
by the doctors and at that time she announced that she was hoping to have
another child, who eventually turned out to be Andrea.153 Here, too, there was
no focus on the particular chromosomes of the child.154 Rather, the point was
that the defendants had created a risk for any child Monusko carried while
remaining unvaccinated.155
In Monusko, the negligent failure to vaccinate resulted in the laterconceived fetus being exposed to rubella. In the Rh factor cases,156 the failure
to administer RhoGAM in a timely way put later-conceived Rh-positive fetuses
at risk. In neither of these kinds of cases did the negligence result in a change
to the mother’s chromosomes.157 In Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories
Inc., the Tenth Circuit addressed whether liability might be imposed where the
harms to the child were the result of a change to the mother’s chromosomes.158

Jill Rose Monusko (Monusko) began prenatal care and treatment at Burns Clinic
on November 22, 1977, prior to the birth of her second child, Loretta Monusko.
The individual defendant doctors provide OB/GYN treatment at Burns Clinic.
Monusko received prenatal care through February of 1978. She was not tested
for her rubella status at any of her visits.
On March 2, 1978, she was admitted to Northern Michigan Hospital,
where Loretta was delivered by at least one of the Burns Clinic defendants.
Monusko was neither tested nor immunized during her stay in the hospital. She
was neither tested nor immunized during her Burns Clinic visit.
See also id.
Plaintiffs put forward the recommendation made by the American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists which states that a rubella test should be given
to the pregnant patient if her status is unknown. They further rely on the ACOG
standard which states that the first postpartum examination is “an optimal time
for review of family planning and for determining immunizations, including
rubella.”
Id. There was no mention in the Monusko opinion of the doctor who gave prenatal care to Jill Monusko
while she was carrying Andrea. See id. That doctor also should have performed the screening, and
the tort action against that doctor would have been more clear-cut. Perhaps that doctor settled with the
family.
153. Id. (“On March 22, 1979, Monusko returned to the Burns Clinic to have her IUD removed.
She indicated to the attending doctor that she wished to have a third child. She was neither tested nor
immunized for rubella at that visit.”).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ind. 1992).
157. See generally Monusko, 437 N.W.2d 367 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
158. 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973).
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At issue in Jorgensen was an allegation that an oral contraceptive had
caused a change in the chromosomes of the woman taking the contraceptive.159
Later, she stopped taking the contraceptive when she was ready to have
children.160 Allegedly, the contraceptive caused a change in her chromosomes
resulting in her children having various serious, debilitating conditions.161
The defendant argued that there could be no liability because the alleged
tortious conduct had occurred prior to the children’s conception.162 The Tenth
Circuit, applying Oklahoma law, rejected that preconception torts were not
cognizable. 163 The court reasoned, “If the view prevailed that tortious conduct
occurring prior to conception is not actionable in behalf of an infant ultimately
injured by the wrong, then an infant suffering personal injury from a defective
food product, manufactured before his conception, would be without
remedy.”164
The Jorgensen court suggested that liability would be imposed if, on
remand, the harms could be shown to have been proximately caused by the
drug.165 An aspect of the Jorgensen opinion worthy of note is that the court did

159. Id. at 239.
The harmful effects are alleged specifically as follows with respect to the claim
for Pamela, the surviving twin:
“Specifically, the aforesaid birth control pills altered the chromosome structure
within the body of the plaintiff’s wife, Alta J. Jorgensen, and as a result thereof,
a Mongoloid deformity was created within the viable fetus of the minor plaintiffs
during the period of development prior to birth.”
Id.
160. Id. at 238.
161. Id. at 239 (alleging that “minor plaintiff, Pamela B. Jorgensen, suffered severe,
excruciating, and constant pain and suffering and mental retardation and deformity as a result of the
aforesaid exposure.”). See also id. (“[T]he deceased twin, Kimberly, adopts the above allegations and
makes other similar averments and seeks damages for retardation, deformity, pain and suffering.”).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 240.
164. Id. See also Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787, 789–90 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994).
For example, assume a party had his furnace repaired and the work was defective
so that the next heating season fumes are released killing a newborn child. We
would conclude that the injury occurred when the fumes were released, not when
the furnace was repaired. Nor would the infant be denied a cause of action
because it was not in existence at the time of the negligent repair.
Id.
165. Jorgensen, 483 F.2d at 240 (“We are persuaded that the Oklahoma courts would treat the
problem of the injuries alleged here as one of causation and proximate cause, to be determined by
competent medical proof.”).
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not reject the children’s cause of action by arguing that once the mother’s
chromosomes had been altered, the only way that the children could have
avoided their congenital difficulties would have been never to have been born
at all.166 Rather than suggest that the relevant alternatives for the children were
living with the congenital difficulties or never having lived at all, the court
instead suggested that the relevant alternatives for the children were living with
the congenital difficulties or living without those congenital difficulties.167 Yet,
if the oral conceptive had caused a change in the mother’s chromosomes prior
to the children’s conception, the children who would have been born had the
mother never used the contraceptive would have been different children, i.e.,
would have had (somewhat) different chromosomes.168 Thus, a different court
might have said that if Alta Jorgensen had never taken the oral contraceptive,
Kimberly and Pamela never would have been born (even if there were other
children with those names).169 But that would mean that Kimberly and Pamela
(the plaintiffs) could only have (1) never lived at all, or (2) lived the lives that
they in fact lived, which would have meant that they likely would have been
barred from bringing an action against the manufacturer.170
To understand why this choice by the Jorgensen court was important, it is
helpful to consider some other cases, for example, Doolan v. IVF America
166. See id. at 241.
167. See id. at 239–40. These would be the relevant alternatives assuming that the plaintiff could
show that the drug proximately caused the children’s difficulties by bringing about a change in the
mother’s chromosomes. Id.
168. Id. at 239.
169. Id. at 238.
The complaint avers that on or about May 1, 1966, and at different times
thereafter, the mother of the twins purchased the company’s Oracon birth control
pills and used them for several consecutive months; that immediately prior to
November 1, 1966, she ceased taking the pills and became pregnant; and that on
July 19, 1967, she gave birth to the Mongoloid twins, Kimberly and Pamela.
Kimberly died in March, 1971. It is claimed that the company is strictly liable in
tort and for negligence and breach of its warranties in the manufacture and sale
of the birth control pills.
Id.
170. Oklahoma does not allow wrongful life actions in certain contexts. See OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 63, § 1-741.12(C) (West 2021) (“In a wrongful life action or a wrongful birth action, no damages
may be recovered for any condition that existed at the time of a child’s birth if the claim is that the
defendant’s act or omission contributed to the mother’s not having obtained an abortion.”). It is simply
unclear what the Oklahoma Supreme Court would say about a wrongful life action in this context,
although very few states recognize wrongful life actions. See Michael A. Berenson, The Wrongful Life
Claim—the Legal Dilemma of Existence Versus Nonexistence: “To Be or Not to Be’’, 64 TUL. L. REV.
895, 901 (1990) (“[F]ew states permit a child to recover in a wrongful life action.”).
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(MA), Inc.171 At issue were the negligence claims brought by Thomas Doolan
and his parents against the defendants.172 Thomas’s parents, Laureen and John,
had given birth to a child with cystic fibrosis173 and they wished to have a
second child who was free of the disease.174 They created several embryos and
had them tested.175 The parents were informed that a particular embryo was
free of the disease and suitable for implantation.176 Only after Thomas’s birth
did Laureen and John learn that they had been wrongly informed that the
embryo was free of the cystic fibrosis gene mutation.177
The Doolan court did not discuss whether any of the other embryos were
free of the gene mutation—had such an embryo been implanted, the Doolans
might have had a child who did not have cystic fibrosis.178
The Doolan court distinguished the Rh factor cases by noting that, in those
cases, “the negligence of the defendant caused the minor plaintiff to be born
with severe defects, when he/she would have otherwise been born healthy.”179
Further clarifying its meaning, the court explained, “[s]tated otherwise, there is
no way Thomas Doolan could ever have been born without cystic fibrosis.”180
171. 12 Mass. L. Rptr. 482, No. 993476, 2000 WL 33170944 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000).
172. Id. at *1 (“This matter comes before this Court on defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on each of plaintiff Thomas Doolan’s negligence claims (Counts III, VI, XII, XVIII, and
XXI), as well as on each of plaintiffs John and Laureen Doolan’s loss of consortium claims (Counts
XXXI through XXVIII, inclusive) . . . .”).
173. Id. (“In 1993, plaintiff Laureen Doolan gave birth to her first child, Samantha, who was
born afflicted with cystic fibrosis.”).
174. Id. (“Mr. and Mrs. Doolan wished to have another child, but they wanted some assurance
that their second child would not have cystic fibrosis.”).
175. Id. (“A cell from each of the resulting ten embryos was then retrieved by MPD, whereupon
the cells were sent to defendant Genzyme Corporation (‘Genzyme’).”).
176. Id. (“In a letter dated December 23, 1996, defendant Katherine Klinger, Ph.D.
(‘Dr.Klinger’), the Vice President of Science at Genzyme, advised MPD that Embryo No. 7 was free
of the cystic fibrosis gene mutation and suitable for implantation.”).
177. Id. (“On November 21, 1997, Mrs. Doolan gave birth to her son, minor plaintiff Thomas
Doolan. Shortly after Thomas’ birth, it was discovered that he did, in fact, suffer from cystic fibrosis
and that his condition was due to the Delta F-508 genetic mutation.”).
178. See id. at *5 (“Mr. and Mrs. Doolan assert that were it not for the alleged negligence of the
defendants, they would currently be raising a boy named Thomas, and that this child would not be
afflicted with cystic fibrosis.”). In a different case, a couple had been told that a few of the embryos
had been free of cystic fibrosis. See Grossbaum v. Genesis Genetics Inst., LLC, 489 F. App’x 613,
615 (3d Cir. 2012). However, at least one of the embryos was not free of the gene and the child born
to them had cystic fibrosis. See id. It is simply unclear whether either of the other two embryos
identified as lacking the cystic fibrosis gene in fact was free of that gene. See id.
179. Doolan, 2000 WL 33170944, at *4.
180. Id.
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Yet, the same point might have been true in Jorgensen (depending upon what
could be proved at trial)—it may be that once Alta Jorgensen’s chromosomes
were changed as a result of taking the oral contraceptive, any children born to
her would have had the congenital difficulties that her children in fact had, i.e.,
there is no way that those children could ever have been born without those
difficulties.
Suppose Alta Jorgensen had never taken the oral contraceptive. Then, it
might be assumed, her children would not have had those congenital
difficulties. But those children would have been different children with
somewhat different chromosomes. The point is not that the Jorgensens should
have been precluded from recovering if in fact the oral contraceptive caused
chromosomal damage resulting in congenital difficulties for their children but,
instead, that the claim that there was no way that a particular child could have
been born without the harm does not alone establish that recovery should be
precluded.
One of the reasons that Thomas Doolan was precluded from recovering for
cystic fibrosis was that the trial court viewed past precedent as controlling.181
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had already decided a case in
which a child had sought damages for his congenital difficulties that allegedly
resulted from a physician’s negligent failure to detect that his mother had a
genetic condition.182 In Viccaro v. Milunsky, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts rejected that the child had a cause of action against the
physician.183 However, the court had also held that the parents had a wrongful
birth action against the physician, and believed that there was no need to permit
the child to recover given that the parents could recover.184

181. Id. at *3 (“The holding in Viccaro is clearly applicable to this case.”).
182. Viccaro v. Milunsky, 551 N.E.2d 8, 9 (Mass. 1990) (“The defendant concluded that Amy
did not have the disease and that there should be no likelihood of her developing the disorder or of
having affected children. . . . On March 27, 1984, Adam was born severely afflicted with anhidrotic
ectodermal dysplasia.”).
183. Id. at 12–13 (“[T]he defendant whose negligence (it is asserted) is a reason for Adam’s very
existence should not be liable for the unfortunate consequences of Adam’s birth with a genetic disease,
such as his pain and suffering, emotional distress, and loss of his parents’ consortium.”).
184. Id. at 11 (“[T]he Viccaros are entitled to recover the extraordinary medical and educational
expenses and other extraordinary costs associated with caring for Adam.”). Id. at 13 (“As long,
however, as Adam’s parents are entitled to recover against the defendant for the extraordinary costs
they will incur because of Adam’s genetic disease, Adam need not have his own cause of action for
those expenses.”).
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In Doolan, neither the child nor the parents could recover.185 That may
have been due to the particular claim the parents asserted—loss of
consortium.186 The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts had rejected a
similar claim when holding that the child could not be awarded damages for a
physician’s having failed to detect a genetic condition in his mother.187
However, the Viccaro court had awarded the parents the extraordinary costs
and expenses associated with their child’s care and education,188 so it may be
that the plaintiffs should have sought those extraordinary expenses rather than
damages for loss of consortium.189
Nonetheless, one point about the Doolan court’s justification for rejecting
loss of consortium damages might be made. That court reasoned that the
“plaintiffs’ assertion that this hypothetical Thomas Doolan would have been
‘healthy’ discounts the possibility that he might have been afflicted with
another type of birth defect or long term illness.”190 But an analogous point
might have been made in the Rh factor cases too, namely, that the child born
(where RhoGAM had been administered in a timely way) might have been
afflicted with some other ailment, but the Doolan court had agreed that recovery
in the Rh factor cases was appropriate, presuming that the child would have
been healthy if only the negligence had not occurred.191
185. Doolan, 2000 WL 33170944 at *4.
Plaintiffs have failed to put forth any evidence suggesting that the defendants are
legally responsible for causing Thomas Doolan to be born afflicted with cystic
fibrosis. This analysis is similar to that found in Section B, regarding Thomas
Doolan’s own negligence claims. Therefore, this Court holds as a matter of law
that M.G.L. c. 231, § 85X does not confer a cause of action for loss of consortium
on the plaintiffs, John and Laureen Doolan.
Id. (citation omitted).
186. Id. (“Plaintiffs John and Laureen Doolan advance two arguments in support of their claims
for loss of consortium.”).
187. Viccaro, 551 N.E.2d at 12 (“We see no basis for the Viccaros to recover for the loss of
Adam’s society and companionship as a normal child . . . .”).
188. Id. at 11 (“[T]he Viccaros are entitled to recover the extraordinary medical and educational
expenses and other extraordinary costs associated with caring for Adam.”).
189. The Doolan court noted that the plaintiff parents in Viccaro had been awarded the
extraordinary medical expenses associated with raising their child. See Doolan, 2000 WL 33170944,
at *3 (citing Viccaro, 551 N.E.2d at 13). However, when denying the Doolans’ loss of consortium
damages, see id. at *5 (“[T]he defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on the
parent plaintiffs’ claims for loss of consortium.”), the court never discusses whether the parents were
awarded other damages.
190. Id. at *5.
191. Id. at *4 (“In both Rinck and Monusko, the negligence of the defendant caused the minor
plaintiff to be born with severe defects, when he/she would have otherwise been born healthy.”).
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C. Liability for Compromised Gametes
The Doolans knew that they were carriers of cystic fibrosis and wanted to
take steps to reduce the likelihood that their second child would have the
disease.192 Other families take different steps to reduce the likelihood of
passing a disease to their children, e.g., by relying on others’ gametes.
Whatever the method used, such couples as a general matter are hoping that
their child will be healthy and may well seek screening of their own or others’
gametes precisely because they want their child to be healthy.193
Couples securing gametes might be hoping that the donor had eyes or hair
of a particular color, e.g., the same colors as one of the members of the
couple.194 Sometimes, the wrong gametes are used, whether inadvertently or
otherwise.195 Or, sometimes, it is alleged that the gametes used were not
screened properly for disease.196 In these cases, the plaintiff may be claiming
that but for the defendant’s negligence or misrepresentation, different gametes
would have been used to create the embryo.197 Were different gametes used,
the child actually born would not have been born and, instead, a different child
would have been born.

192. Id. at *1.
193. See Michelle McEntire, Compensating Post-Conception Prenatal Medical Malpractice
While Respecting Life: A Recommendation to North Carolina Legislators, 29 CAMPBELL L. REV. 761,
761 (2007) (“I don’t care if it’s a boy or a girl, as long as it’s healthy. It is the mantra of almost all
expectant parents.”).
194. See, for example, Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 68 (Utah 1998),
wherein the couple sought a donor who “closely matched David in physical characteristics and blood
type . . . .”
195. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Jacobson, 48 F.3d 778, 779 (4th Cir. 1995) (in
different cases, the physician used his own sperm rather than the sperm of the husband or that of a
donor for artificial insemination).
196. Johnson v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 654 (Ct. App. 2002).
Cryobank, Sims and Rothman failed to examine or test Donor No. 276 to
ascertain whether he was suffering from kidney disease or was a potential carrier
of the ADPKD gene, failed to properly investigate Donor No. 276’s family
history of kidney disease, and falsely represented to the Johnsons that the sperm
they were purchasing had been tested and screened for infectious and “reasonably
detectable genetically transferred” diseases and medical abnormalities, and
therefore could safely be used to effectuate the Johnsons’ pregnancy.
Id.
197. Id. at 666 (“Implied in these allegations is that had the Johnsons been informed of the
genetic risk, they would have selected another donor, and Brittany would not have been born.”).
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That a different child would have been born should not end the analysis,
however. Consider Johnson v. Superior Court.198 At issue was an allegation
that the sperm bank “failed to disclose that the sperm they sold to the Johnsons
came from a donor with a history of kidney disease called autosomal dominant
polycystic kidney disease (ADPKD).”199 After noting that “had the Johnsons
been informed of the genetic risk, they would have selected another donor, and
Brittany would not have been born,” the California appellate court concluded
that, therefore, the particular damages sought could not be awarded.200
However, in so ruling, the court was not rejecting that any damages could have
been awarded but merely that governing law precluded awarding the particular
damages that the plaintiff had sought.201 Thus, while the Johnson court
suggested that general damages could not be awarded citing a state supreme
court case,202 the very case cited permitted an award for the extraordinary
expenses that might be associated with treating a particular inherited disease.203
Thus, past case law supported the Johnson court awarding damages for the
extraordinary expenses associated with the child’s care, notwithstanding that
Brittany was not in existence at the time the negligence occurred and
notwithstanding that a different child with different DNA would (probably)
have been born but for the negligence.204
In Paretta v. Medical Offices for Human Reproduction, a New York court
considered whether there could be recovery when a child, created through the

198. 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650 (Ct. App. 2002).
199. Id. at 653.
200. Id. at 666.
201. Id. (“We conclude that the trial court fairly characterized Brittany’s cause of action as one
for wrongful life, and that under Turpin and Andalon Brittany is not entitled to recover general damages
or damages for lost earnings.”).
202. Id. at 664.
With respect to the child’s claim for pain and suffering or other general damages,
our Supreme Court held that “recovery should be denied because (1) it is simply
impossible to determine in any rational or reasoned fashion whether the plaintiff
has in fact suffered an injury in being born impaired rather than not being born,
and (2) even if it were possible to overcome the first hurdle, it would be
impossible to assess general damages in any fair, nonspeculative manner.”
Id.(citing Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 963 (Cal. 1982)).
203. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 966 (“[W]hile a plaintiff-child in a wrongful life action may not recover
general damages for being born impaired as opposed to not being born at all, the child—like his or her
parents—may recover special damages for the extraordinary expenses necessary to treat the hereditary
ailment.”).
204. See Johnson, 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 664–66.
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use of a donated ovum, was born with cystic fibrosis.205 The defendants
allegedly failed to do a proper screening of the egg to make sure that it did not
carry the cystic fibrosis gene.206 In addition, the husband whose sperm was
used to create the embryo was never tested to see if he was a cystic fibrosis
carrier.207
The plaintiffs argued that this case differed from the paradigmatic wrongful
birth claim in that the defendants had not merely failed to inform them in a
timely way about the likelihood that the child created would have cystic
fibrosis.208 Here, “the defendant doctors were actually responsible for
Theresa’s conception, had a role in her genetic composition, and combined the
sperm and egg both of which carried cystic fibrosis.”209 But the court rejected
the parents’ claim, reasoning that Theresa, “like any other baby, does not have
a protected right to be born free of genetic defects.”210
While the Paretta court was correct that no one has a protected right to be
born without handicap, that does not dispose of the relevant issue. The children
born with severe difficulties as a result of a doctor’s failure to administer
RhoGAM in a timely way did not have the right to be born free of handicap,
but their injuries were nonetheless compensable.211 So, too, while the children
born with genetic handicaps resulting from someone or something altering their
parents’ chromosomes do not have a protected right to be born free of genetic
handicap, these children should nonetheless be able to recover damages if the
defendants negligently acted in ways that would result in foreseeable harm.
The Paretta court did not bar the parents from recovering the extraordinary
expenses associated with caring for their child.212 Nonetheless, the court’s
analysis was disappointing when the court refused to recognize that the child
had a cause of action because “permitting infants to recover against doctors for
wrongs allegedly committed during in vitro fertilization would give children

205. 760 N.Y.S.2d 639, 641–42 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (“Tragically, Theresa was diagnosed with cystic
fibrosis, a chronic debilitating progressive genetic disease that is inherited from both parents.”).
206. Id. at 642 (“In October 2000, plaintiffs commenced this action, alleging defendants
committed medical malpractice when they failed to properly screen the egg and inform the Parettas
that the egg tested positive for the cystic fibrosis gene.”).
207. Id. at 641 (“Mr. Paretta was not tested to ascertain whether he was a carrier of the disease.”).
208. Id. at 643.
209. Id. at 645–46.
210. Id. at 646.
211. Id. at 648.
212. Id. at 647 (noting that the “Parettas can pursue recovery for the pecuniary expense they have
borne and continue to bear for the care and treatment of their sick infant.”).
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conceived with the help of modern medical technology more rights and
expectations than children conceived without medical assistance.”213 Such a
rationale, if taken seriously, might require a substantial reworking of
reproductive negligence.
Consider a fetus suffering from a condition that might be ameliorated or
cured with treatment in utero.214 If the fetus does not receive that treatment
because of a medical professional’s negligence, the professional is likely liable,
even though that professional is not responsible for the fetus initially having
that condition.215 It is precisely because of the availability of modern medical
technology (and the failure to use it) that such a medical professional would be
held liable—liability would not be imposed but for the existence of the
ameliorative or curative treatment.216
A separate issue involves the kinds of in utero treatment that might be
performed.217 Suppose that a particular gene could be modified in utero so that
the child eventually born would not have a serious debilitating condition.218
213. Id. at 646.
214. See, for example, Ruth M. Farrell, Women and Prenatal Genetic Testing in the 21st
Century, 23 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 11 (2013), which discusses “the possibility and availability of
interventions to ameliorate the sequelae of a genetic condition in utero . . . .”).
215. Courts rejecting the imposition of liability often emphasize that the condition was incurable.
See Grubbs ex rel. Grubbs v. Barbourville Fam. Health Ctr., P.S.C., 120 S.W.3d 682, 689 (Ky. 2003);
Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 536 (N.C. 1985); Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 744
(Mo. 1988).
216. See Holt v. Nelson, 523 P.2d 211, 219 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
[T]he elements which must exist to impose liability upon a physician under the
informed consent doctrine are the existence of (a) a duty to inform, (b) a failure
to inform, (c) evidence that, if informed, the patient would have chosen a different
course of treatment, and (d) injury resulting from the treatment followed.
Id.
217. Colleen Malloy, Monique Chireau Wubbenhorst & Tara Sander Lee, The Perinatal
Revolution, 34 ISSUES L. & MED. 15, 29 (2019).
Now, several novel techniques are being investigated that show real promise of
augmenting fetal repair, serving as alternatives for specific prenatal conditions,
and even expanding the breadth of conditions treated in utero. For example, in
utero cellular therapy, tissue engineering, gene-based therapies, and the artificial
womb are all advancing quickly and may offer tremendous benefits to the fetus
in the near future.
Id.
218. Sarah Roa, Designing Children: Tort Liability for Medical Providers in the Era of
CRISPR/CAS-9 Genetic Editing, 47 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 300, 307–08 (2020).
Targeted genome editing is a process that allows scientists to mutate a gene of
interest by deleting segments of the gene, inserting more genetic sequences, or
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Presumably, the modification of that one gene would not be thought to make
the individual a different person,219 although some line would have to be drawn
to determine when the number or quality of changes would indeed make the
person a different individual.220
Yet, too much should not be made of the conundrum of how many or which
kind of gene changes would yield a new person rather than simply be a
continuation of the old person. It might be rather difficult to set a number (e.g.,
six gene changes still involve the same person but seven involve a different
person). Further, there might be good reason not to set a particular number of
changes that would make the individual a “new” person.221
Gene editing has been heralded as a possible scientific breakthrough that
will enable scientists to prevent individuals from having certain diseases.222
substituting some genes for other genes. The general aim of genetic editing is to
modify a specific characteristic of an organism by changing a small portion of the
organism’s genetic code. In doing so, there is great potential for curing various
genetic diseases.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
219. Id. at 320 (“[C]hanging a single gene does not necessarily result in the creation of a new
person.”); Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for
Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 333 (2008) (“But to argue that changing
a single gene, even a gene that controls for a central component of one’s identity, always results in the
creation of a different person seems to place too much emphasis on genetics.”).
220. See Matthew Reisman, Harm and the Fluid Nature of Identity in Wrongful Life Cases
Involving Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 405, 418 (2014).
[A]ny individual who claims that some modifications will preserve identity while
others will not is presented with the unenviable task of determining at what
specific point a person’s identity changes. This recalls the famous paradox of the
Ship of Theseus, in which the planks of a ship are replaced until none of the
original planks remain, and one may wonder whether it is still the same ship, or
at what point its identity changed.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
221. Drawing a line between what constitutes the old person and a new person is fraught with
difficulties. Cf. Mark Strasser, Prenatal Tort Slippage, 31 HEALTH MATRIX 221, 257–58 (2021).
There are other criteria [besides DNA] that are essential to making the person
what she is, for example, an individual’s personality or her concept of self. But
if that is so and if the allegedly negligent conduct changed those essential
elements, then an individual caused to have severe mental deficits would be
precluded from suing—had the negligence not occurred, the unharmed individual
without the mental deficits would have had a different personality and concept of
self and thus would have been someone else. Ex hypothesi, this individual was
not harmed because but for the negligence the individual would have been a
different person.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
222. See Roa, supra note 218, at 300–02.
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Prevention of certain diseases might be accomplished by targeting one gene,223
while prevention of other diseases might require targeting several genes.224
When the technology has been sufficiently developed, it will be used on
living persons.225 In addition, it will be used in utero226 or on embryos preimplantation.227 A number of legal issues will have to be resolved.
For example, suppose that it were necessary to modify several genes of an
individual in order to prevent great suffering.228 Presumably, an individual who
has received such treatment would not be viewed as a new person post-

223. John M. Conley, Introduction: A Lawyer’s Guide to CRISPR, 97 N.C. L. REV. 1041, 1045
(2019) (“In the simplest application, the CRISPR mechanism finds and cuts out a 'defective’ gene—
for example, one that causes a single-gene disease such as cystic fibrosis, hemophilia, or sickle cell
disease—and the cell replaces it with a normal one.”).
224. Teddy Ellison, Why Genetics Is CRISPR than It Used to Be: Helping the Novice Understand
Germ Line Modification and Its Serious Implications, 26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 595, 604 (2017)
(“CRISPR . . . has been shown to effectively target multiple genes at once . . . , potentially opening the
doors to curing several genetic diseases . . . .”). See also Conley, supra note 223, at 1047.
There is a long way to go before CRISPR gene editing becomes part of everyday
patient care, but it has the potential both to “fix” the causes of single-gene
diseases and to contribute to the prevention or treatment of diseases that are
caused by a complex interaction of genes and environmental factors, including
cancer and heart disease.
Id.
225. Tessa R. Davis, Freezing the Future: Elective Egg Freezing and the Limits of the Medical
Expense Deduction, 107 KY. L.J. 373, 422 (2018) (“[G]ene editing can be used as care for already
living persons . . . .”). Ellison, supra note 224, at 596 (“[G]ene therapy—the practice of correcting
defective genes to battle diseases in living humans—has been seen as a potential scientific
breakthrough with great promise for future generations . . . .”).
226. Grant Hayes Frazier, Defusing a Ticking Time Bomb: The Complicated Considerations
Underlying Compulsory Human Genetic Editing, 10 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 39, 42 (2019) (“Fastforward 10 years. In utero gene editing is effective, safe, inexpensive and, perhaps, covered by
insurance.”).
227. See Ann Potter, To Edit or Not to Edit?—Regulating CRISPR Transnationally, 53 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1727, 1728 (2020).
In the fall of 2018, Chinese scientist Dr. He Jiankui announced that he edited the
genes of human embryonic cells for the first time in history, and that the mother
had given birth to the babies already. Dr. He inserted CRISPR/Cas-9 (Clustered
Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats/CRISPR-associated protein 9)
into germline cells, in order to naturally immunize the babies to human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Once the embryonic cells received the vector,
they were then placed in the mother via in vitro fertilization. Nine months later,
Dr. He announced his feat, propelling the global community into the germlineediting era without its permission.
Id. (citations omitted).
228. See id. at 1737–38.
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treatment, as if the person (pre-treatment) had been killed and replaced.229 By
the same token, substantial gene editing performed in utero should not be
viewed as bringing about the death of one individual to create another, which
might have implications for civil or criminal liability.230
Whatever approach is adopted with respect to potential liability in the use
of this new technology, it must protect the medical professionals who do (even
substantial) gene editing to prevent terrible suffering.231 Yet, such a system
should not immunize the medical professional who performs the relevant
procedures negligently or recklessly, thereby causing patients needless
suffering, whether that gene editing is performed on an independent person or
is performed in utero or is performed on embryos prior to implantation.232 As
the cases involving RhoGAM illustrate,233 there is no need to preclude the
229. See id. at 1738.
230. Cf. Marka B. Fleming, Feticide Laws: Contemporary Legal Applications and
Constitutional Inquiries, 29 PACE L. REV. 43, 44 (2008) (“Most state legislatures have . . . passed laws
against fetal homicide, or feticide.”). To make matters more complicated, the law does not always
define individuals in the same way for all purposes. See id. at 44–45. For example, a child might be
considered to be part of one family for certain purposes but not for other purposes. See, e.g., Andrea
Smith, Blood & Money: A Conflict in Texas Statutes Regarding Adoptees’ Inheritance Rights from and
Through Biological Parents, 3 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. 217, 232 (2016) (“Currently, along with Texas,
there are three other states that allow an adopted child to inherit from the birth parents: Kansas,
Louisiana, and Rhode Island.”). An individual might be considered of one sex for certain purposes but
not for other purposes. See Mark Strasser, Defining Sex: On Marriage, Family, and Good Public
Policy, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 57, 59 (2010) (“[A] transgendered individual might be considered
male for purposes of identification on a birth certificate or driver’s license but be considered female
for purposes of determining the sex of potential marriage partners.”). Before the Court issued
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015), striking down same-sex marriage prohibitions, individuals
might be precluded from marrying because of how the state defined sex for purposes of marriage. See
id.
231. Here, this gene editing is presumed to be voluntary. Some commentators are worried about
whether such therapy will be required. See, e.g., Angela Liang, Gene Therapy: Legal and Ethical
Issues for Pregnant Women, 47 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 61 (1999); Potter, supra note 227 at 1736 (“Given
the low cost and availability of CRISPR treatment, if an individual refused to modify his or her
‘violent’ genes and later committed a violent act, questions arise over how a person ought to be
punished for refusing the treatment.”).
232. But see Barbara Pfeffer Billauer, Wrongful Life in the Age of CRISPR-CAS: Using the Legal
Fiction of “The Conceptual Being” to Redress Wrongful Gamete Manipulation, 124 PENN ST. L. REV.
435, 482 (2020) (noting that the law treats genetic manipulation in utero differently from genetic
implantation of embryos pre-implantation).
233. An Indiana court used the Rh factor analysis to discuss why liability could be imposed for
intentionally using the wrong sperm in an artificial insemination procedure. See Anonymous Physician
1 v. White, 153 N.E.3d 272, 278–79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Because the individual suing was the child
born as a result of the artificial insemination, see id. at 274 (“Matthew filed the complaint after he had
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imposition of liability merely because the child has not yet been born or the
embryo has not yet been implanted. Indeed, the Rh factor cases and Jorgensen
suggest that a medical professional who negligently or recklessly harms an
individual not yet conceived might nonetheless be liable. 234
Gene editing is helpful to think about because it may provide techniques in
the future for correcting conditions that are now viewed as incurable.235 But it
is also helpful for thinking about how certain kinds of negligence should be
treated currently.
Consider the Doolans, who had been falsely told that the embryos they were
going to have implanted did not have the cystic fibrosis gene.236 One approach
to such cases is to deny recovery because it is speculative to make assumptions
about what would have happened had a different embryo been implanted.237
But that is not the approach taken in the Rh factor cases, which instead simply
assume what the child’s life would have been like had the RhoGAM been
timely administered.238 Analogously, courts might make assumptions about
what life would have been like had there been gene editing to prevent or
ameliorate the disease.239 The point is not that the gene editing is available but
instead is to provide a way of thinking about the baseline in light of which to
determine damages.
Even when the gene-editing technology has developed sufficiently to afford
these great benefits, a separate issue will involve how much it costs and who
learned that Physician had used Physician’s own sperm, rather than a medical school resident’s donor
sperm, to artificially inseminate Matthew’s Mother, Elizabeth White (‘Elizabeth’). As a result of this
artificial insemination procedure, Elizabeth became pregnant and gave birth to Matthew.”), the plaintiff
would not have existed but for the negligence. See id. at 275. The Indiana court rejected the argument
that in effect the plaintiff was arguing that he should not have been born (because other sperm should
have been used) and thus that this plaintiff could not be allowed to recover. See id. at 281.
234. See Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Lab’ys, Inc., 483 F.2d 237, 241 (10th Cir. 1973); Martin
v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787, 789–90 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
235. Frazier, supra note 226, at 41 (“Recent developments indicate these technologies hold great
promise for future applications, and several experts have noted that these technologies’ efficacy is
rapidly progressing and clinical use is likely not far off.”) (footnote omitted).
236. Doolan v. IVF Am. (MA) Inc., 12 Mass. L. Rptr. 482, No. 993476, 2000 WL 33170944, at
*1 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000).
237. See Jorgensen, 483 F.2d at 239.
238. See Doolan, 2000 WL 33170944, at *4. See also Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 595
(Ind. 1992); Monusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 369–70 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
239. See also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013)
(“[Gene editing] enabled Myriad to develop medical tests that are useful for detecting mutations in a
patient’s BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes and thereby assessing whether the patient has an increased risk of
cancer.”).
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will have access to the technology.240 Suppose, for example, that a couple could
create several embryos and have them tested for the presence of a particular
gene as a way of assuring that their child will not have a particular disease. Or,
the couple could incur much greater expense (and perhaps greater risk,
depending upon how well the technology had progressed) by creating embryos
that might undergo gene editing to prevent the occurrence of that same disease.
As a matter of public policy, it would hardly be sensible to impose liability for
negligent or reckless gene editing but not for the negligent or reckless medical
professional who implants the wrong embryo and thereby brings about the very
harm that the testing and implantation procedure was designed to avoid.
IV. CONCLUSION
Wrongful birth and wrongful pregnancy/conception cases involve
negligence that might have occurred pre- or post-conception. States differ with
respect to whether they recognize these causes of action and, if recognizing
them, the kinds of damages that are potentially awarded. States also differ with
respect to whether any importance should be attributed to whether the
negligence occurred pre- or post-conception.
That there are these differences is unsurprising, given differing public
policy priorities. But these public policy differences do not suggest that states
should have differing policies with respect to whether liability should be
imposed for negligent testing and implantation of embryos, because the reasons
cited by states to limit or preclude liability in the context of wrongful pregnancy
and wrongful birth cases are usually not implicated in the negligent testing and
implantation cases.
In the wrongful birth cases, some states are reluctant to impose liability
because they believe that nature, rather than negligence, was responsible for the
underlying condition. But the underlying condition in the negligent testing and
implantation cases is not due to nature but to the professional’s negligence.
Where there are two substances and the tester wrongly identifies which is
poisonous, we do not immunize the tester because nature made the one but not
the other poisonous. Nor do we immunize the professional who could have
ameliorated a condition merely because nature was the initial cause of the
condition.
240. Laura Hercher & Anya E.R. Prince, Gene Therapy’s Field of Dreams: If You Build It, Will
We Pay?, 97 N.C. L. Rev. 1463, 1465 (2019) (“High costs and inequities of access are hardly unique
to gene therapy, but these new treatment models, wildly expensive and resistant to economies of scale,
threaten to bring the problem to a new level with profound societal implications.”).
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Some states view abortion rights with a jaundiced eye and do not wish to
permit any cause of action based on the claim that but for someone’s negligence
the pregnant woman would have aborted her pregnancy. The negligent testing
and implantation cases are not predicated on a lost opportunity to abort.
Further, permitting liability in these kinds of cases will presumably result in
fewer mistakes which might result in fewer abortions.
Gene editing may provide a wonderful way to prevent needless suffering.
Merely because a condition is congenital will not mean that it cannot be
ameliorated or cured. Once those techniques are developed, medical
professionals will not be able to escape liability for their negligence or
recklessness by blaming nature for causing the condition. But we do not need
to wait until those techniques are developed to see why individuals who have
been negligent in testing or implanting embryos should be held responsible if
they played a causal role in the production of a child with the very conditions
that the testing was designed to detect and prevent. Courts should consider the
rationales and justifications that are already entrenched in tort law, which
should lead them to understand why the current refusal to permit recovery in
cases involving the use of compromised gametes is consistent with neither the
existing jurisprudence nor good public policy.

